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EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN U.S. PATENT LAW
TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK*

ABSTRACT

Globalization has eroded traditional territorial limits on
intellectual property laws. Although this pressure was first seen
in trademark and copyright law, recent court decisions have
demonstratedthat the territoriallines of U.S. patents are also under
assault. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently considered extraterritorialityin U.S. patent law in its 2007 decision in Microsoft
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., discussed thoroughly in this Article. Courts
and commentators have offered two primaryapproachesto deal with
the issue of the extraterritorialreach of U.S. patents. First, many
courts, including the Supreme Court, continue to adhere to a strict
view of a patent's territoriallimits, affording protection only within
the United States. This approachis overly broad in that it precludes
effective protectionfor patent holders even when the usual concerns
surroundingextraterritorialityare not present. Second, other courts
and commentators would adopt far-sweeping, effects-based tests, in
which any effect on the U.S. market is a basis to permit the patent to
cover acts occurring outside the United States. Such approaches,
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however, fail to explicitly consider foreign law and risk creating
conflicts with foreignjurisdictions.
This Article rejects both approaches and articulates a novel
approachthat would requirecourts to explicitly considerforeign law
in assessing whether to enforce a patent extraterritorially.In essence,
to infringe the U.S. patent,the patentholderwould have to prove that
the infringer would also infringe under the laws of the foreign
country. If there would be some sort of conflict with foreign law, then
the patent cannot be enforced. This balanced approach requires
courts to address potential conflicts of law and comity concerns
transparently,which fosters greaterunderstandingof foreignpatent
law and hopefully facilitates internationalpatent law norms that
may help harmonize national patent laws through this informal
mechanism.
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INTRODUCTION

The world is truly a smaller place. Markets are increasingly
global in nature, with goods and services crossing borders routinely.
Such a shift is in stark contrast to intellectual property rights,
which are still national in nature: a patent, copyright, or trademark
only affords the owner the right to exclude within a given country's
borders.1 This divergence between markets and property rights can
create difficulties for companies seeking to protect such intangible
assets.2 Differing national intellectual property laws raise transaction costs in navigating international business transactions because
the rights afforded may differ from country to country. Businesses
must anticipate the varying levels of protection and attempt to
maximize their opportunities on a country-by-country basis. The
ascendance of the Internet as a medium for business transactions,
coupled with technology that has digitized many works, has placed
considerable stress on the copyright and trademark regimes,
resulting in considerable debate about the best way to deal with
territoriality issues.'
1. Some regional patent arrangements provide supranational procedures for obtaining
patents, such as the European Patent Convention, OAPI and ARIPO (both in Africa), and the
Eurasian Patent Convention. See Tshimanga Kongolo, The African Intellectual Property
Organizations: The Necessity of Adopting One Uniform System for All Africa, 3 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 265, 270 (2000) (discussing francophone Organisation Africaine de la Propridtd
Intellectuelle (OAPI) and anglophone African Regional Industrial Property Organization
(ARIPO)); John Richards, Recent PatentLaw Developments in Asia, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 599, 605-08 (1997) (describing the standard for patentability under the
Eurasian Convention as novelty and industrial applicability). These procedures still result in
national patents. See, e.g., European Patent Convention pt. 2, ch. iii, art. 64, Oct. 5, 1973,
1065 U.N.T.S. 274 (noting grant of national-level rights); Protocol on Patents and Industrial
Designs Within the Framework of the African Regional Industrial Property Organization
(ARIPO) § 3, Dec. 10, 1982, available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docsnew/en/zz/zz004en.
html [hereinafter Harare Protocol]; Kongolo, supra, at 270; Richards, supra, at 608 n.37
(describing the Convention on the Grant of European Patents).
2. See, e.g., Greg Hitt, Patent System's Revamp Hits Wall, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2007, at
A3 ("The spillover of [globalization] worries into the patent debate 'shows the breadth of
concerns about this model of globalization' ....").
3. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why NationalCourts Should
Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 477-89 (2000); Rochelle Dreyfuss, The ALI
Principleson TransnationalIntellectual Property Disputes: Why Invite Conflicts?, 30 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 819, 823-25 (2005); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on
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In contrast to copyright and trademark law, many commentators
viewed patent law as the most territorially based form of intellectual property because most inventions were tangible in nature and
because patents are subject to extensive review by a national
government prior to the patent rights being granted.4 The expansion
of subject matter to cover intangible inventions, such as business
methods and software, 5 has begun to place pressure on these
historical territorial limits in patent law. Recent cases confirm that
patent law is now beginning to buckle under the pressure.6 Moreover, numerous commentators have noted this pressing issue within
the court system,7 although none have offered a satisfying solution
Jurisdictionand Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual PropertyMatters, 77 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1065, 1066-67 (2002). See generally Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New
Foundations,90 GEO. L.J. 883, 884 (2002).
4. See Donald S. Chisum, Normative andEmpiricalTerritorialityin IntellectualProperty:
Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 603, 604 (1997) ("The territorial scope of patent
and other intellectual property laws is no longer a problem at the periphery of intellectual
property policy deliberations."); Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality Waning? Patent
Infringement for Offering in the United States To Sell an Invention Abroad, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 701, 704-05 (2004) [hereinafter Holbrook, Territoriality];John R. Thomas, Litigation
Beyond the Technological Frontier: Comparative Approaches to Multinational Patent
Enforcement, 27 LAW & POL'Y IN'L Bus. 277, 278 (1996).
5. See, e.g., Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1338-41 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(finding software components on golden master discs to be protectable under 35 U.S.C. §
271(0); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (granting protection for business methods). But see In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding arbitration method not appropriate subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101).
6. See, e.g., NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd. (NTP 11), 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir.
2005); AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1746
(2007).
7. See, e.g., Graeme W. Austin, ImportingKazaa-ExportingGrokster, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 577,600-01 (2006); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency,
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 410 n.181 (2005); Yar Chaikovsky & Adrian Percer,
Globalization, Technology Without Boundaries & the Scope of U.S. Patent Law, 9 U.S.F.
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 95, 95 (2005); Christopher Cotropia, Observations on Recent Patent
Decisions: The Year in Review, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 46, 68 (2006); Denise W.
DeFranco & Adrienne N. Smith, Technology and the GlobalEconomy: ProgressChallenges the
Federal Circuit To Define the ExtraterritorialScope of U.S. Patent Law, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 373,
374 (2006); Alan M. Fisch & Brent H. Allen, The Application of Domestic Patent Law to
Exported Software: 35 U.S.C. § 271(), 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 557, 584-89 (2004); Eric W.
Guttag, When Offshore Activities Become Infringing. Applying § 271 to Technologies that
"Straddle"TerritorialBorders, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2007); Holbrook, Territoriality,supra
note 4, at 705-06; Dariush Keyhani, U.S. Patent Law and ExtraterritorialReach, 7 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 51, 52 (2005); Andrew F. Knight, Software, Components, and Bad
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to the erosion of territorial lines. Patented inventions now routinely
transcend national borders, which places patent owners in the
difficult position of protecting these assets.
One approach to dealing with this problem is to harmonize
intellectual property laws so that they are generally uniform from
country to country. This uniformity reduces the cost of evaluating
the varying laws of the relevant countries. In fact, many efforts have
been made to harmonize international intellectual property rights,
although most resulting agreements have set floors of protection
instead of equivalent levels of protection.8 Even if all of the rights
are the same, however, enforcing the rights would require litigation
in each and every country where there is infringement. Such piecemeal litigation is a costly endeavor.9 Moreover, it may be subject to

Logic: Recent Interpretationsof Section 271(f), 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 493, 493
(2005); Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 263 (2005);
John W. Osborne, A Rational Analytical Boundary for Determination of Infringement by
Extraterritorially-DistributedSystems, 46 IDEA 587, 588 (2006); Barry Sookman, ExtraTerritorialApplication of Patent Law: A First Look at the NTP v. RIM Litigation, 18 INTELL.
PROP. J. 453, 453 (2005); William R. Thornewell II, Patent Infringement Prevention and the
Advancement of Technology: Application of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) to Software and "Virtual
Components," 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2815, 2815-16 (2005); Daniel P. Homiller, Note, From
Deepsouth to the Great White North: The ExtraterritorialReach of United States Patent Law
After Research in Motion, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 17; Elizabeth M.N. Morris, Comment,
TerritorialImpact Factors:An Argument for Determining Patent Infringement Based Upon
Impact on the U.S. Market, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 351, 351-53 (2006);
Bridget A. O'Leary Smith, Note, NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.: Losing Control and
Findingthe Locus of Infringing Use, 46 JURIMETRICS 437, 438 (2006); Tyler J. Overall, Note,
Physical Supply of Intangible Components: Misapplicationof § 271(f) Haunts Microsoft, 16
FED. CIR. B.J. 219, 220-21 (2006); Steven C. Tietsworth, Comment, Exporting Software
Components-Finding a Role for Software in 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) ExtraterritorialPatent
Infringement, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 405, 408 (2005); Virginia Zaunbrecher, Note, Eolas,
AT&T, & Union Carbide: The New Extraterritorialityof U.S. PatentLaw, 21 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 33, 33-34 (2006). Professor Dan Burk was quite prescient in his description of these
potential territoriality issues. See Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and
Infringement on Global Computer Networks, 68 TUL. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1993) [hereinafter Burk,
Cyberspace];Dan L. Burk, TransborderIntellectual PropertyIssues on the ElectronicFrontier,
6 STAN. L. & POLY REv. 9, 11-12 (1994) [hereinafter Burk, Transborder].
8. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 3,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS]. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent
Clause: Are There Limits on the United States' Ability To Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 1, 1-3 (2004) [hereinafter Holbrook, Treaty Power].
9. Cf. Dinwoodie, supra note 3, at 534-35 ("The economic premises underlying the
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failure because the patent holder must anticipate the markets in
which infringing activity may arise. Once the patents have issued
in one country, it is generally impossible to seek later patent
protection. Thus, if the patentee guesses wrong-and someone
begins to infringe in a country where she failed to seek protection
-she will be unable to enforce the patent.
Intellectual property rights holders theoretically could bring
claims for infringement of foreign patents within a single country's
courts. For example, a U.S. patent holder could sue not only for
infringement of the U.S. patent but also for infringement of a
Japanese patent. The entire case would be litigated in the U.S.
court. This approach would eliminate the need for litigation in every
country where IP rights are held. Unfortunately, at least with
respect to patents, the Federal Circuit has closed this door, holding
that it is an abuse of discretion for district courts to hear claims for
infringement of foreign patents.' °
A third way of dealing with these problems is to provide extraterritorial reach to domestic intellectual property rights." If domestic
rights can reach activity outside of a given state, then the rights
holder can coordinate activities through the use of fewer domestic
rights, as opposed to assembling a portfolio of national rights from
a variety of countries. Of course, the extraterritorial application of
nationally based rights is strongly disfavored and risks interfering
with the sovereignty of the other country into whose territory the
rights holder is reaching. Patent laws vary from country to country,

international copyright conventions-namely, creation and exploitation of copyrighted works
nationally and, if internationally, serially on a country by country basis-have become
detached from social and economic reality.").
10. See Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that it is an abuse of
discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over foreign patent infringement claims). For
a thorough discussion of the history of U.S. courts hearing--or not hearing--claims of
infringement of foreign patents, see Kendra Robins, Note, ExtraterritorialPatentEnforcement
and MultinationalPatent Litigation:ProposedGuidelinesfor U.S. Courts, 93 VA. L. REV. 1259,
1279-86 (2007). I believe that U.S. courts should be willing to hear foreign patent claims,
although such a conclusion does not alter the need for a reassessment of the extraterritorial
reach of U.S. patent.
11. Robins's proposal blends the use of multinational litigation and extraterritoriality. See
Robins, supranote 10, at 1310-13. There is much to commend in this approach, although the
extraterritorial component of her proposal causes some concern, as discussed infra in note
172.
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and the use of a U.S. patent to regulate behaviors in another
country can run afoul of policy differences in the affected country.
Until recently, Congress was the primary agent of change as it
relates to the territorial nature of patent rights. The courts would
strictly construe the territorial limits of U.S. patent rights,1 2 and
Congress would amend the Patent Act to deal with these perceived
loopholes.'" But recent cases show that Congress is not acting
expediently in closing new perceived loopholes that are arising in
protection. In some cases, the courts have been willing to step up
and extend the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patents in ways that
are shockingly different from the reticence expressed in the past.
These efforts often are made to avoid gaming of the system by
parties aware of the territorial limits of the patent system, but
even these judicial efforts may not eliminate all such gamesmanship.1 4 In other cases, however, the courts have limited patent rights
strictly to cover activities only within the United States. As such,
the current state of the law is unclear and lacks a firm theoretical
foundation. The courts have failed to articulate a persuasive
jurisprudence for assessing the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent
rights.
In light of these new pressures on domestic patent laws, the time
has come to make a systemic reevaluation of the territorial nature
of U.S. patent rights. Included within this assessment is whether
Congress or the courts should be the agents of change and what type
of steps should be taken, if any, to protect patent holders in the
global marketplace. This Article presents a comprehensive analysis
of this problem. It concludes that Congress does not have the
dexterity to react to an ever-changing marketplace of new technologies, leaving the courts in the best position to address these
concerns. Currently, however, the courts are not appropriately

12. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 271(0 (2000); see Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246,
1252 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that § 271(f) overruled Deepsouth in part). Calling
this a "loophole" of course reveals a normative bias that U.S. patents should cover these acts.
One could view these "loopholes" as the proper functioning of a territorially based patent
system.
14. See Lemley et al., supra note 7, at 266, 269, 271, 283 (showing examples of gaming the
system).
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balancing the variety of interests in these cases and instead are
myopically focusing on strict statutory interpretation without considering the broader consequences of their decisions. This Article
offers an approach to extraterritoriality in which courts would
explicitly consider foreign patent laws to determine whether the
enforcement of the U.S. patent would create a conflict with the
foreign law. If there is no conflict, then generally the U.S. patent
can be enforced against the infringer notwithstanding that some of
the acts may be outside of the United States. A conflict with foreign
law, however, would preclude the extraterritorial application of the
U.S. patent.
Part I explores the two approaches to the extraterritoriality of
U.S. patents currently discussed by the courts and commentators:
either applying a strict territorial approach to U.S. law or using an
effects-based analysis. Both of these approaches contain significant
flaws that preclude their efficacy. Part II, therefore, articulates the
new, conflicts-based approach. This section posits that courts
should be willing to enforce U.S. patents extraterritorially, but only
after carefully considering the interests of the implicated foreign
countries. Patent laws and policies can vary from country to
country, and these differences often are worthy of respect and
deference. The Article offers a methodology for navigating these
complicated issues in hopes of balancing the interests of U.S. patent
holders and foreign countries. Part III then explores various
possible disadvantages and potential objections to the comparative
method, ultimately concluding that these concerns are unwarranted.
Significantly, this proposal would afford broader protection to
patent holders while respecting the variations in patent law that
frequently arise amongst countries. Although some may question
the institutional competence of courts to decide such issues, this
Article will demonstrate that courts-with perhaps some assistance
from the executive-sit in the best position to address these
concerns. In an era of considerable debate about the patent system,
the time has come to reconsider-and reform-the territoriality
principle.
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I. VARYING APPROACHES TO QUESTIONS OF TERRITORIALITY

Courts, Congress, and commentators have reacted to the increasing pressure to use national patent rights as a means to regulate
foreign conduct in two primary ways. One approach is to apply a
strict territorial rule: patent rights will be confined to the territorial
United States, and any aspect of the invention that occurs outside
the United States is outside the scope of the patent right. Until
recently, this approach had been the norm; courts would apply U.S.
law to extraterritorial activities only reluctantly. A second approach
is to afford broad application of U.S. patent rights to activities
occurring outside the United States that may impact the U.S.
market in some way. Courts have used both of these approaches in
different contexts. This Part will explore the strict territorial
approach and the broader, effects-based approaches that are present
in current patent law. Ultimately, neither of these approaches is
satisfactory.
A. A Strict TerritorialApproach to Patent Infringement
Although Congress undeniably has the authority to regulate
acts outside the territorial limits of the United States, the courts
generally have required a clear statement from Congress that it
intended to exercise this authority. The reluctance to afford reach
to domestic laws is rooted in a number of concerns: potential
conflicts with another nation's laws, international comity, choiceof-law issues, congressional intent, and separation of powers.'"
Although the Supreme Court has articulated a presumption against
the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, it is not consistently
applied.16
In the context of patent law, Congress's clear statement generally
has been to have strict territorial limits. The infringement provi-

15. Curtis A. Bradley, TerritorialIntellectual PropertyRights in an Age of Globalism, 37
VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 513-16 (1997).
16. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1758 (2007); EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
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sions of the Patent Act contain such limits stated expressly within
them: these provisions apply only to acts within the United States.
Specifically, 35 U.S.C. § 271 prescribes what constitutes infringement of a patent. Currently, § 271(a) of the Patent Act states that
"whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells, any
during the term of
patented invention, within the United States ...
the patent therefor, infringes the patent."17 The statute therefore
explicitly contains a territorial restriction: all infringing activities
must occur within the United States. The Supreme Court has long
adhered to the view that patent rights are strictly territorial in
nature.
1. The Supreme Court's Strict Adherence to TerritorialLimits
for Patents
The Supreme Court has recognized that patent rights are
territorially limited, even before the 1952 Patent Act. As far back as
1856, the Supreme Court noted that "these acts of Congress do not,
and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United
States; and as the patentee's right of property and exclusive use is
derived from them, they cannot extend beyond the limits to which
the law itself is confined."'" Almost sixty years later, the Court

17. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (requiring all provisions to connect to the United States).
18. Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195-96 (1856) (holding use of invention on
foreign vessel in U.S. harbor not infringement). The Court suggested that Congress's
constitutional power under the Patent Clause was also territorially limited. Id. at 195 ('The
power thus granted is domestic in its character, and necessarily confined within the limits of
the United States."). This language predates modern understandings of both the Patent and
Commerce Clauses. For discussions on Congress's constitutional authority as it relates to
intellectual property, see generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Copyright Lawmaking Authority:
An (Inter)NationalistPerspective on the Treaty Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355, 355-64
(2007); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The
IntellectualPropertyClause as an Absolute Constrainton Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119,
1167; Holbrook, Treaty Power, supra note 8, at 2-3; Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property
and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272, 361-62 (2004); Kevin A. Goldman,
Comment, Limited Times: Rethinking the Bounds of Copyright Protection, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
705, 740 (2006); Joseph C. Merschman, Note, Anchoring Copyright Laws in the Copyright
Clause:Halting the Commerce ClauseEnd Run Around Limits on Congress'sCopyright Power,
34 CoNN. L. REV. 661, 692-93 (2002); Carolyn T. Ngyuen, Note, Expansive Copyright
ProtectionForAll Time?Avoiding Article I HorizontalLimitations Through the TreatyPower,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1079, 1079-84 (2006).
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reaffirmed this strict view of the reach of the patent laws, denying
damages for sales in Canada of a patented item because "[t]he right
conferred by a patent under our law is confined to the United States
and its Territories and infringement of this right cannot be predicated of acts wholly done in a foreign country."19
In the modern era, the Supreme Court has twice emphasized
the presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S.
patents: in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram in 1972,20 and in
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T in 2007.21 In Deepsouth, the Court confronted the situation in which all components of the invention were
manufactured within the United States, but the complete machines
were never assembled within the United States. Instead, the
accused infringer, Deepsouth, sought "to make the parts of [the
patented] machines, to sell them to foreign buyers, and to have the
buyers assemble the parts and use the machines abroad. 2 2 It was
undisputed that the completed machine would have infringed the
patent at issue if the defendant had built completely assembled
did have
machines within the United States. Although the patentee
23
them.
enforce
not
did
seemingly
it
patents,
foreign
The Supreme Court concluded that there was no infringement in
this context. The Court reasoned that "[t]he statute makes it clear
that it is not an infringement to make or use a patented product
outside of the United States," so the infringer could not be liable
under those forms of infringement.2 4 The key question, thus, was
whether Deepsouth had sold the invention in the United States.
The Court concluded that Deepsouth had not made such a sale
and therefore there was no infringement. The Court easily could
have interpreted "make" simply to mean the creation of the various components without actually putting the pieces together. 25
19. Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915) (citations
omitted).
20. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
21. 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
22. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 523.
23. Id. at 531 ("Respondent holds foreign patents; it does not adequately explain why it
does not avail itself of them.").
24. Id. at 527. But see id. at 532-33 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (rejecting this
interpretation of "make" as too narrow).
25. The four dissenting justices would have done just that. See id. at 532-34. The Federal
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Similarly, the Court could have held that these acts constituted a
sale of the invention even without its complete construction. But
they did no such thing. In part due to "this Nation's historical
antipathy to monopoly,"2 6 the Court construed the statute, in the
absence of a "clear and certain signal from Congress," to "strictly
enforce" the limits on the enforcement of a patent.2 v
Congress provided the "clear and certain" signal regarding the
scope of patent protection. In 1984, Congress adopted 35 U.S.C. §
271(f) statutorily abrogating the holding in Deepsouth. Under §
271(f)(1), the exportation of the unassembled components of a
patented invention is an infringement if the exporter actively
28
induces the assembly of the device outside of the United States.
Congress went further than even the Deepsouth problem, however,
by enacting § 271(f)(2). Now exporting a single component of an
invention that is neither a staple article of commerce nor which has
a substantial noninfringing use is also infringement if the exporter
knows that the component's only use is in the patented device and
also knows that it will be combined outside of the United States into
the completed device.29
The Supreme Court interpreted § 271(f) for the first time in
Microsoft, in which the Court addressed two separate but related
questions: whether computer software could constitute a "component," and whether the copying of such software constitutes
"supplying" under § 271(f).3 ° AT&T owned a patent covering "an

Circuit also applied a broader meaning to the word "make," although in the context of
assessing the temporal, not the territorial, limits of a patent. See Paper Converting Mach. Co.
v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 19-20 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding infringement because
the device was an "operable assembly" even though it was never completely assembled during
the patent term).
26. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 530 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). But see Timothy R.
Holbrook, Liability for the "Threat of a Sale". Assessing Patent Infringement for Offering To
Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale PatentabilityBar and Other Forms of
Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 799 (2003) [hereinafter Holbrook, Threat of a
Sale].
27. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 531. But see Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 26, at 759
(arguing that the Supreme Court inappropriately conflated infringement by selling and
making).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 271(0(1) (2000).
29. § 271(f)(2).
30. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1750-52 (2007).

2008]

EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN U.S. PATENT LAW

2133

apparatus for digitally encoding and compressing recorded
speech. 3 1 Microsoft sent its Windows operating software abroad by
either e-mail or by sending physical master discs. 2 Microsoft's
overseas customers in turn would copy the software from the
master disc onto other discs, which then would be used to install
the software on computers.3 3 The master discs were never used to
directly install software onto the computers.3 4 Microsoft conceded
that it would infringe AT&T's patent once the software was
installed on a computer, if those computers were located within the
United States.3 5 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's
judgment of infringement, concluding that software could be a
"component" of an invention even though it is intangible,3 s and that
copying the software was an impermissible supplying of the
component.
The former question had been addressed by the Federal Circuit
in an earlier case, Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.3" In
that case, the Federal Circuit reasoned that nothing in the statute
limits § 271(f) to physical components. Given the Patent Act's broad
definition of invention, the court concluded that "every form of
invention eligible for patenting falls within the protection of section
271(f)," and therefore that "every component of every form of
invention deserves the protection of section 271 (f)."3" Moreover, the
court concluded that the code on the master disc was a component
under § 27 1(f), rejecting the argument that such code was more akin
to a blueprint or set of instructions because the code was functionally essential to the software invention. The court recognized that

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 1750.
Id. at 1753.
Id.
Id.
Id.
AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366,1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct.

1746 (2007).

37. Id. at 1370. In answering that question, the Federal Circuit reasoned that because
"supplying" software requires making a copy, copying is subsumed in supplying software
components. The court admittedly interpreted the statute broadly to produce the legislative
intent behind the provision. Id. at 1371.
38. 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
39. Id. at 1339.
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software and hardware can be interchangeable, suggesting that
software could be a component. The Federal Circuit also believed
the legislative history of § 271(f) suggested a broad interpretation,
as the purpose of the provision was to provide protection "for all
forms of patented inventions."4 °
The Supreme Court disagreed with the reasoning of the Federal
Circuit and reversed. As to the first question-whether software
could be a "component" under § 271(f)-the Court distinguished
between software in the abstract and software as found in a tangible
medium, such as CD-ROM. The Court noted that the Federal
Circuit had failed to identify whether its holding in Eolas dealt with
software in the abstract or in a tangible medium.4 1 The Court
recognized that this distinction had significant implications for the
second question presented regarding whether copying of software
constituted supplying the component:
If the relevant components are the copies of Windows actually
installed on the foreign computers, AT&T could not persuasively
argue that those components, though generated abroad, were
"supplie[d] ...
from the United States" as § 271(f) requires for
liability to attach. If, on the other hand, Windows in the abstract
qualifies as a component within § 271(f)'s compass, it would not
matter that the master copies of Windows software dispatched
from the United States were not themselves installed abroad as
working parts of the foreign computers.
The language of the statute requires a component be combinable
with other components, suggesting a physical aspect to it. The Court
concluded that, although software in a tangible medium can be
43
such a component, software in the abstract cannot be in this case.
Notably, the Court narrowly construed its holding, declining to
40. Id. at 1340.
41. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1754 n.10.
42. Id. at 1754.
43. Id. at 1755 ("Until it is expressed as a computer-readable 'copy,' e.g., on a CD-ROM,
Windows software-indeed any software detached from an activating medium-remains
uncombinable. It cannot be inserted into a CD-ROM drive or downloaded from the Internet;
it cannot be installed or executed on a computer. Abstract software code is an idea without
physical embodiment, and as such, it does not match § 271(0's categorization: 'components'
amenable to 'combination."').
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answer whether software in the abstract could never be a component, whether other intangibles could be components, and whether
method44 and process inventions qualify for protection under §
27 1(f).
The Supreme Court then held that copying the software from the
master disc to other discs did not constitute "supplying" under §
271(f) because the copies actually installed on the foreign computers
came from the copies made from the master disc and not from the
master disc directly. 4 The Court rejected the Federal Circuit
majority's view that copying subsumes supplying and instead
embraced Judge Rader's dissenting opinion in this case. 46 The Court
reasoned that "the copies of Windows actually installed on the
foreign computers were not themselves supplied from the United
States. Indeed, those copies did not exist until they were generated
by third parties outside the United States. 4 7
Importantly, the Supreme Court based much of its reasoning on
the presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S.
patent laws. Noting that "[t]he presumption that United States law
governs domestically but does not rule the world applies with
particular force in patent law," the Court explained that "the
presumption tugs strongly against construction of § 271(f) to
encompass as a 'component' not only a physical copy of software, but
also software's intangible code, and to render 'supplie[d] ... from the
United States' not only exported copies of software, but also
duplicates made abroad. '48 The Court applied the presumption even
though § 271(f) represents an exception to the territorial principle,
noting that '"the presumption is not defeated ... just because [a

44. Id. at 1756 n.13; cf. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425
F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (applying § 271(f) to a method claim). The concurrence in
Microsoft by Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas and Breyer, concluded that components
must be tangible items; because nothing physical from the master discs was transferred to
either the software copies or computers, there could be no infringement. See Microsoft, 127
S. Ct. at 1762 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito suggested that there could be infringement
in this case only if the computer used the CD-ROM itself to run the software. See id. Justice
Stevens would have concluded that software in the abstract could be a component of a
patented invention. Id. at 1763 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 1757 (majority opinion).
46. Id. at 1756-57.
47. Id. at 1757 (footnotes omitted).
48. Id. at 1758.
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statute] specifically addresses [an] issue of extraterritorial application;' it remains instructive in determining the extent of the
statutory exception."4 9 In sum, the Court explained, "foreign law
alone, not United States law, currently governs the manufacture
and sale of components of patented inventions in foreign countries.
If AT&T desires to prevent copying in foreign countries, its remedy
today lies in obtaining and enforcing foreign patents."50
The Court recognized that its decision could create a '"oophole,"
but nevertheless concluded that Congress, not the courts, was the
proper institutional actor to correct such concerns.5 1 Just as in
Deepsouth, any further expansion of the 52extraterritorial reach of
U.S. patents was left "in Congress' court.
Although the courts' application of the presumption against
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws has been inconsistent in
other contexts,5 3 the Supreme Court has consistently applied it in
the context of patent law.5 4 The Court, therefore, espouses a
dialectic approach in which courts narrowly construe the Patent Act
to limit the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patents to trigger an
appropriate response, if any, from Congress.
2. The Federal Circuit's OccasionalStrict TerritorialApproach
The Federal Circuit's exploration of the issue of extraterritoriality
has given, at best, inconsistent results. One can discern two strands
of the court's jurisprudence: a strict territorial approach on the one
hand, and a willingness to provide extraterritorial relief on the
other. Conspicuously absent from either approach, however, is a

49. Id. (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 1759 (citation omitted); see also id. at 1759 n.17 (noting AT&T's patents in
Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, and Sweden).
51. Id. at 1759 ("While the [Federal Circuit] majority's concern is understandable, we are

not persuaded that dynamic judicial interpretation of § 271(f) is in order. The loophole,' in our
judgment, is properly left for Congress to consider, and to close if it finds such action
warranted."); see also id. at 1760 ("Given that Congress did not home in on the loophole AT&T
describes, and in view of the expanded extraterritorial thrust AT&T's reading of § 271(f)
entails, our precedent leads us to leave in Congress' court the patent-protective determination
AT&T seeks.").
52. Id. at 1760.
53. See Bradley, supra note 15, at 507.
54. See id. at 508.
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consistent theory, method, or justification for the court's conclusions. Instead, the court has treated these issues as isolated matters
of statutory interpretation with little concern for the extraterritorial
consequences of these decisions. This subsection will examine the
cases that have generally rejected the extraterritorial application of
a U.S. patent.
a. Limiting the ExtraterritorialReach of Injunctive Relief
Acts of infringement often implicate foreign conduct; as such,
courts may need to wrestle with the appropriate scope of injunctive
relief when dealing with acts that might have implications for
the U.S. patent holder. In this context, the Federal Circuit has
recognized that, although it may have the authority to issue an
injunction with extraterritorial effect, 5 it should be hesitant to do
SO.
For example, in Johns Hopkins University v. CellPro, Inc., the
Federal Circuit rejected the district court's injunction requiring the
infringer to return vials of the infringing good to the United States
for destruction. 6 The infringer had prepared the vials prior to the
issuance of the patent and exported them to Canada post-issuance
to supply foreign markets.5 7 The Federal Circuit acknowledged that
the equitable powers of federal courts "can reach extraterritorial
even if these activities do not themselves constitute
activities ...
infringement."5 " The injunction, however, must prevent current or
future infringement. 59 The court noted that the pre-issuance
creation and subsequent exportation of the vials did not infringe the
relevant patent, nor was it likely to cause future infringement.6" The

55. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
56. Id. at 1366.
57. Id. at 1353.
58. Id. at 1366.
59. Id. at 1366-67.
60. Id. at 1366 ("Mere possession of a product which becomes covered by a subsequently
issued patent does not constitute an infringement of that patent until the product is used,
sold, or offered for sale in the United States during the term of the patent. Likewise, neither
export from the United States nor use in a foreign country of a product covered by a United
States patent constitutes infringement." (citations omitted)).
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court specifically noted that injunctive relief, however, cannot be
used to exert extraterritorial control over foreign markets:
[T]o the extent that Hopkins complains that CellPro's infringement has damaged its ability to service foreign markets,
Hopkins must rely on foreign patent protection. See Deepsouth,
406 U.S. at 531, 173 U.S.P.Q. at 774 ("Our patent system makes
no claim to extraterritorial effect.... To the degree that the
inventor needs protection in markets other than those of this
country, the wording of 35 U.S.C. §§ 154 and 271 reveals a
congressional intent to have him seek it abroad through patents
secured in countries where his goods are being used.") ....
Such
a complaint cannot be remedied by the imposition of an injunction under Section 283.61
Consequently, the Federal Circuit rejected the district court's
repatriation injunction."
More recently, the Federal Circuit emphasized the need to constrain the scope of injunctions to avoid reaching extraterritorially.
In InternationalRectifier Corp. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,6 3 the
court addressed whether an injunction against an infringer could
reach activities that took place outside the United States when
those acts, if occurring in the United States, would have been
contemptuous.64 Samsung was previously enjoined from infringing
the relevant patent, but, along with a third party IXYS, performed
otherwise infringing acts outside of the United States.6" The court
explicitly recognized the territorial limits of a U.S. patent 6 and
reasoned that "none of the cases cited by the district court purports
to extend the scope of liability under the Patent Act beyond the
territorial boundaries of the United States."6 7 As a result, the

61. Id. at 1367 (some internal citations omitted).
62. Id. ('CThose portions of the district court's permanent injunction order that ordered
repatriation and destruction of vials exported by CellPro to Biomira and by-products produced
thereby are not consistent with the stated purpose of Section 283-to prevent infringement.").
63. 361 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
64. Id. at 1360.
65. Id. at 1357-58.
66. Id. at 1360.
67. Id. at 1361.
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68
Federal Circuit rejected the district court's judgment of contempt,
drawing a strong territorial line and prohibiting an injunction from
reaching activity occurring wholly outside of the United States.

b. Section 271(g) Liability for Importing Products of Patented
Processes
Aside from exportation protection under § 271(f), Congress
adopted a similar provision to prevent arbitrage of process patents
due to territorial limits. In 1988, Congress passed the Process
Patent Amendments Act 69 that provided additional extraterritorial
protection by adopting § 271(g). ° This provision defines as an act of
infringement the importation of, sale of, or offer to sell in the United
States a product made by a patented process, even if that process is
performed outside of the United States. 71 There is no infringement,
however, if the final product either "is materially changed by
subsequent processes" or "becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product. 7 2 Absent § 271(g), a competitor could
circumvent a U.S. process patent by performing the process outside
of the United States and importing the unpatented product into the
United States. Section 271(g) is Congress's response to this problem
and closes, in patch-work fashion, another perceived territorial
wrinkle in patent protection. Affording this type of protection is also
required under our international treaty obligations.7 3
The Federal Circuit's interpretation of this provision has been far
from consistent. In some decisions, the court has afforded extraterritorial reach to this provision, whereas in others it appears to apply
a strict territorial view. In contrast to the Federal Circuit's gradual
expansion of the scope of § 271(f) before the Supreme Court's
intervention in Microsoft, the court did restrict the reach of § 271(g).
In Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,74 the Federal Circuit
addressed whether importation of intangible information alone
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 1361-62.
Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 9001-07, 102 Stat. 1563-67 (1988).
§ 9003, 102 Stat. at 1563-64.
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000).
§ 271(g)(1)-(2).
See TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 28(1)(b).
340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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constituted the product of a patented process, and held that it did
not.7 5 The process claims at issue covered a method of identifying
substances that activated or inhibited the production of proteins in
a cell.76 Thus, the "product" of the process was not a physical item
but instead was data. The patent owner asserted that using the
process overseas and then relying on the information to produce the
activator or inhibitor in the United States was importation of the
"product" of the process, the information regarding the activator
or
inhibitor."
The court rejected this argument and narrowly construed § 2 7 1(g)
to cover only the physical products of methods of manufacturing
products. Using traditional statutory interpretation methodology,
the court reasoned that the term "made" refers to its ordinary usage
of "to manufacture," requiring the creation of a physical item.7' The
statutory defense for a product that has been materially changed
suggests that the product must be physical and not merely data.7 9
Finally, the court reviewed the legislative history, concluding that
Congress intended only physical products of patented processes to
be covered. One purpose for adopting § 271(g) was to supplement
the protections available through proceedings at the International
Trade Commission, which covers "articles" imported into the United
States. This legislative history suggested that Congress intended
only physical products to be covered. The court has subsequently
determined that the sending of e-mails into the United States does
not count as the importation of the product of a process because
there is no physical construct imported.80
In a world with business method patents and other processes in
which the key output of the process is purely data,"' this interpretation significantly narrows the reach of U.S. law. For example,

75. Id. at 1377.
76. Id. at 1368-69.
77. Id. at 1371.
78. Id. at 1372.
79. Id.
80. See NTPII, 418 F.3d 1282, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
81. The Federal Circuit has recognized that the scope of patent eligible subject matter is
not coextensive with the reach of the various infringement provisions. See id. at 1324 ("AT&T,
State Street Bank, Alappat, and Chakrabarty do not command a different result because
sections 101 and 271(g) are not coextensive in their coverage of process inventions.").
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clinicians could avoid infringement of a gene patent, or method
claims correlating certain mutations with disease, by sending a
patient's tissue sample abroad, having it purified and analyzed
there, and sending the data results back to the United States.
Sending a raw tissue sample would not implicate § 271(f), and
importing the resulting data about the sequence would not be the
physical importation of the product itself.
Importantly, Bayer highlights the hopelessly inconsistent methodology used by the Federal Circuit in analyzing these issues. The
result in Bayer cannot be reconciled with the Federal Circuit's Eolas
decision. Unlike Eolas, the court in Bayer used the ambiguity of the
term "made" and the legislative history to conclude that § 271(g) is
limited to the production of physical items. 2 Although both
statutory provisions were designed to address issues created by the
territorial nature of patent rights, these two provisions now have
considerably different scope. 3 There seems to be no legitimate basis
for treating the two provisions differently when they both address
similar concerns.8

82. Bayer, 340 F.3d at 1374 ("Even if the legislative history did not affirmatively suggest
an intent to limit coverage to manufactured 'articles' in accordance with section 1337, we have
been directed to nothing in the legislative history suggesting that Congress was concerned
that the preexisting statutory scheme failed to reach intangible information ....").
83. See Catherine Tornabene, Note, The Export-Import Dilemma: Inventions and
Employment Abroad, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 153, 154 (2006).
84. Cf. Lemley et al., supranote 7, at 283 (suggesting interpreting § 271(g) to include "the
importation of data produced abroad by a patented process"). But see Tietsworth, supra note
7, at 439-40 (arguing against interpreting §§ 271(0 and (g) similarly). A recent district court
case has attempted to bridge these inconsistencies. In CNET Networks, Inc. v. Etilize, Inc.,
the Northern District of California held that an intangible electronic catalog could be the
product of a patented process under § 271(g). 528 F. Supp. 2d 985, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Microsoft v. AT&T, the court distinguished Bayer
by noting:
This court agrees with CNET that Microsoft is instructive for the concept that
an electronic catalog, like computer software, is not simply an intangible
collection of information, but can also be thought of as having a physical,
tangible embodiment once it is expressed and stored on computer readable
media in the form of magnetic fields on a hard drive or etchings on a CD-ROM.
The catalog in this case, therefore, is distinguishable from the abstract
information at issue in Bayer. The claims in this case are directed toward
creation of a product catalog stored on computer readable media, not the
identification of whether a particular substance inhibits or does not inhibit a
particular protein. In other words, the electronic catalog in this case, far from
being abstract information or knowledge, is a physical article no different from
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3. The Advantages and Disadvantagesof DrawingStrict
TerritorialLines for PatentInfringement
The apparently simplest approach to dealing with territoriality
issues is to strictly limit patent infringement to acts entirely within
the United States, much like the Supreme Court has done in
Deepsouth and Microsoft. If any part of the patented invention
exists or is performed outside of the United States then there is no
infringement. A strict adherence to the territoriality principle would
make it much easier to predict whether there should be infringement. Congress could then address any concerns legislatively, as
it did in adopting §§ 271(f) and (g). If Congress concluded that the
interest in the U.S. patent is sufficient, then it could adopt legislation to expand patent protection in response to the courts' adherence
to territoriality. This approach would be consistent with the
Supreme Court's insistence on clear signals from Congress that it
intends to extend the reach of American law outside the territorial
U.S.8" The primacy of Congress in establishing the scope of patent
rights would be retained.
This colloquy between the courts and Congress does have
significant downsides, however. Congress must react to the courts'
overtures, which can take time. For instance, Deepsouth was decided in 1972, and Congress did not overrule it with § 271(f) until
1984. Such delays could be costly to the affected patent holders,
particularly for those whose patent terms expire during the period
of delay. Moreover, congressional action will always be piecemeal
and reactive; it is unlikely that Congress would be able to anticipate
various ways that companies would arbitrage the system to take
advantage of the rules of territoriality. Instead, a problem would

a product catalog manufactured and assembled on paper bound with stitching,
glue or staples. The court holds that the catalog is a "product" within the
meaning of section 271(g) which is "made by" CNET's patented processes and is
"imported" and "used" in the United States by Etilize and Etilize's customers.
Id.
85. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram, 406 U.S. 518 (1972); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil. Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ('CWe assume that Congress legislates against the backdrop
of the presumption against extraterritoriality. Therefore, unless there is 'the affirmative
intention of the Congress clearly expressed,' ... we must presume it 'is primarily concerned
with domestic conditions."' (citations omitted)).
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develop and Congress would respond. In contrast, the courts will be
the first to confront these scenarios and would be better situated to
address them up-front.
The position of the courts on the "front lines" of these issues
highlights another problem with adhering to territoriality. Faced
with these scenarios where a seeming injustice is being perpetrated
against a patent holder, a court may engage in arguably tortured
statutory constructions to combat the situation. Instead of waiting
for Congress, the courts may try to address the problem, resulting
in odd and disingenuous statutory interpretations like those of
Eolas and AT&T. 6 It was precisely this concern that motivated
the Federal Circuit to afford § 271(f) such broad protection in the
Microsoft case:
Were we to hold that Microsoft's supply by exportation of the
master versions of the Windows®software-specifically for the
purpose of foreign replication-avoids infringement, we would
be subverting the remedial nature of § 271(f), permitting a
technical avoidance of the statute by ignoring the advances in a
field of technology-and its associated industry practices-that
developed after the enactment of § 271(f). It would be unsound
to construe a statutory provision that was originally enacted to
encourage advances in technology by closing a loophole, in a
manner that allows the very advances in technology thus
encouraged to subvert that intent. Section 271(f), if it is to
remain effective, must therefore be interpreted in a manner that
is appropriate to the nature of the technology at issue.8"
Such a strained interpretation undermines the territorial approach,
subverts Congress's role in the process, and only serves to create
uncertainty. It also shows that courts may feel compelled to act
unilaterally to remedy perceived unfairness that may arise due to
changes in technology, short-circuiting the Supreme Court's preferred deference to Congress.

86. The Federal Circuit's decision in NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282,
1322 (Fed. Cir. 2005), is another example of such tortured statutory construction. That
decision is discussed rigorously infra at notes 122-37 and accompanying text.
87. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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Finally, strict territorial limits often may be overkill. One key
reason the courts do not generally afford extraterritorial reach to
U.S. laws is the fear of creating a conflict with the laws of another
sovereign.' In some cases, particularly in patent law where much
of the law is harmonized, these fears of conflict are overstated and
the extraterritorial application may not create a problem. Indeed,
it could be helpful for courts to consider the variations in patent law
amongst other nations instead of simply closing the door for every
case. The complete absence of balancing potential competing policy
interests in these interpretations is rather stark and unfortunate in
terms of creating a greater dialogue on patent law and policy. A
strict territorial approach, therefore, does not in fact guarantee that
those limits will be enforced and fails to truly consider whether a
conflict would develop.
B. Affording ExtraterritorialReach to U.S. Patents
In contrast to strictly limiting U.S. patent rights to cover acts
solely within the United States, the courts could afford a broader
extraterritorial reach to U.S. patents. A strand of this approach can
be seen in the Federal Circuit's case law. In fact, these cases are in
tension with the previously discussed cases that have limited the
scope of patent protection in favor of a strict territorial approach.
The court has interpreted the same provision to give broad extraterritorial protection. Moreover, several commentators have proposed
even broader extraterritorial application of U.S. patents based on an
effects-based approach: if the activities affect the U.S. market for
the patented good in some way, then there should be infringement
of the U.S. patent. Section one of this Part explores the Federal
Circuit cases extending the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patents.
This review demonstrates the lack of consistency and coherency in
the Federal Circuit's approach to these issues. Section two explores
the various effects-based proposals offered by commentators.
Finally, section three evaluates the benefits and disadvantages of
affording broad extraterritorial coverage for patents.

88. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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1. Federal Circuit Case Law Evincing Broader Extraterritorial
Protection
Although some Federal Circuit decisions declined to allow U.S.
patent rights to cover foreign acts, others demonstrated a willingness to extend the protection afforded by patents to activities
outside the United States. This section explores these decisions and
notes that, even where the court provides greater protection in this
regard, the court lacks a coherent justification for this expansion.
Moreover, many of these cases are irreconcilably inconsistent with
other decisions that hold the territorial line more strictly.
a. Injunctions Reaching Outside of the United States
Although the Federal Circuit in some cases emphasized the importance of limiting an injunction's extraterritorial reach, in others
the court has provided such a remedy. In Spindelfabrik SuessenSchurrv. Schubert & Saizer MaschinenfabrikAktiengesellschaft, the
Federal Circuit reviewed an injunction that the district court had
expanded in light of a recalcitrant infringer.89 The injunction
covered goods that were not in the United States but were "destined
for delivery" into the United States.9" The injunction also required
"all advertising materials, promotional literature, brochures, press
releases and the like" to note that the machine was "not available
for sale or use in, or delivery to the United States" and that all
goods be labeled as "not available for sale or use in, or delivery to,
the United States."9 1 The injunction therefore regulated conduct
outside of the United States. Regardless, the Federal Circuit
rejected the infringer's argument that the injunction "impermissibly
extends the reach of American patent law beyond the boundaries of
the United States by applying its prohibitions to those machines"
that were manufactured in Germany.9 2 The court found the
provisions to be "a reasonable and permissible endeavor to prevent

89.
90.
91.
92.

903 F.2d 1568, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1577 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1577-78.
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infringement in the United States .... ,
The court, therefore,
allowed the injunction to reach goods that were not in the United
States on the basis that they could at some point be infringing.
b. Federal Circuit'sExpansive Interpretationof § 271(f)
Before the Supreme Court reined in the scope of § 271(f) to some
extent in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., the Federal Circuit consistently gave that provision a rather broad scope. For example,
in Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems Corp.,9 4 the court addressed
the question of whether the patented device actually had to be
assembled outside of the United States for infringement. The
accused infringer had manufactured all of the components and
exported them but never assembled the complete patented system. 95
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit decided there could be infringement, holding that exportation of the components without assembly
was in fact infringement under § 271(f)(1).96 Although "infringement
without a completed infringing embodiment is not the norm in
patent law," the court concluded that the failure to assemble the
device did not preclude a finding of infringement.9 7 An intent to
make the combination is sufficient to trigger § 271(f)(1) liability.9 8
In justifying its decision, the Federal Circuit feared that requiring
overseas assemblage would "pose the appearance of 'giving extraterritorial effect to United States patent protection."'99 Ironically, by
allowing infringement without actual assembly, the court broadened

93. Id. at 1578.
94. 245 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Prior to Waymark the court declined to reach the issue
of whether § 271(f) applied to method and process inventions when the appellant had failed
to preserve the issue for appeal. See Sw. Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 1290
(Fed. Cir. 2000). The court addressed § 271() in Rotec Industries,Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215
F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2000), rejecting the argument that an "offer to supply" a component was
sufficient to trigger liability when the infringer never actually supplied the component. Id. at
1258.
95. Waymark, 245 F.3d at 1365. The accused infringer did not assemble the components
because of the lawsuit. Id.
96. Id. at 1368.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (quoting Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 17
(Fed. Cir. 1984)).
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the category of infringing acts, creating even greater extraterritorial
consequence. °° Consequently, the court initially took a broad view
of § 271(f), giving the provision considerable scope over acts outside
of the United States.
Subsequently-though temporarily-the court took a more restrained view of § 271(f). In Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 1 the
accused infringer "designed [the components] within the United
States" and transmitted "the instructions for their manufacture and
from within the United States. 1 °2 The components
disposition ...
themselves were never made in the United States, however. The
Federal Circuit held that these acts did not constitute infringement
under § 271(f): "[T]here can be no liability under § 271(f)(1) unless
components are shipped from the United States for assembly."' 1 3 In
discussing the scope of § 271(f), the court stated that the components must be "physically present in the United States,"'0 4 suggesting that those components could not be something intangible.
After Pelligrini, the Federal Circuit concluded in Eolas that
"components" could be intangible items such as software,' ° and that
10 6
the copying of software constituted supplying the component.
Although the Supreme Court subsequently rejected the latter
conclusion and left the former in doubt, the Federal Circuit had
already moved beyond Eolas and AT&Tto give more extraterritorial
reach to § 271(f). In Union Carbide Chemicals & PlasticsTechnology
Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., the court concluded that infringement under
§ 271(f)(2) was possible for the exportation of a catalyst to be used
abroad in a patented process.0 7 Previously, the court suggested that
§ 271(f) would not apply to method claims;0 8 nevertheless, relying

100. See Joan E. Beckner, Note, PatentInfringement by ComponentExport:Waymark Corp.
v. Porta Systems Corp. and the ExtraterritorialEffect of U.S. Patent Law, 39 HoUS. L. REV.
803, 832 (2002); see also Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 26, at 819 n.386.
101. 375 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
102. Id. at 1115.
103. Id. at 1117.
104. Id.
105. Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
106. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005), reu'd, Microsoft
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
107. 425 F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
108. See NTP II, 418 F.3d 1282, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court, although
skeptical of applying § 271(f) to methods, did not answer the question. See Microsoft, 127 S.
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on the same statutory interpretation methodology used to give
expansive protection under § 271(f) in Eolas and AT&T, the court
concluded that nothing in the statute excludes patented methods
from protection under this provision. As such, the catalyst could be
viewed as a part of the patented process, and its exportation-so
long as it had no substantial non-infringing use-would trigger
liability under § 271(f)(2). Although some believed that § 271(f)
was limited to physical inventions, 10 9 the Federal Circuit has now
broadly expanded this provision to cover not only intangible
components but also method claims.
c. Expanding § 271(g)'s Liabilityfor Importing the Product of
a PatentedProcess
Although the Federal Circuit circumscribed the scope of § 271(g)
in Bayer by limiting it to the importation of physical items, in other
ways it has expanded the extraterritorial reach of the provision.
For example, in Bio-Technology GeneralCorp. v. Genentech, Inc., the
court interpreted the term "product" in the statute in an appeal of
the grant of a preliminary injunction.10 The process as claimed
covered the production of a plasmid that could produce a protein,
but the product made by the accused infringer was just the protein.
The court concluded there was still infringement and afforded the
term "product" a broad reading"' notwithstanding the differences
between the final products." 2
Ct. at 1756 n.13 ("If an intangible method or process, for instance, qualifies as a 'patented
invention' under § 271(f) (a question as to which we express no opinion), the combinable
components of that invention might be intangible as well.").
109. See Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 434 F.3d 1357, 1358
(2006) (Lourie, J., dissenting from the order denying rehearing of the case en banc) ('The
whole tenor of that provision relates to physical inventions, i.e., apparatus or compositions,
not methods.... [The inventions in [Eolas and AT&T] were apparatus or systems, not methods
or process.... A component of a process is a step in the process; it is not the physical material
to be used in the process.").
110. 80 F.3d 1553, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
111. Id. at 1560-62.
112. Id. The court has treated § 271(g) inconsistently in other ways as well. For example,
in Bio-Technology, the court also held that the acts that trigger liability are the selling,
offering to sell, or importing the product of the patented process; if these acts took place after
the statutory provision came into place-even if the process had been performed before the
date the statute was enacted-there is infringement. Id. at 1560.
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A broad reading of the statute affords greater extraterritorial
reach to the U.S. patent. Such concerns counsel against broad
interpretations, contrary to the reasoning of the Federal Circuit.
The court failed to take into account the lesson from Deepsouth that
statutes that risk extraterritorial consequences should be afforded
a narrow reading, not a broad one. Moreover, conspicuously absent
from the court's discussion was any concern for the possible interference with foreign patent law that this interpretation could create.
For example, the patented process could be viewed as unpatentable
in the relevant country, and allowing the use of the U.S. patent to
control this activity undermines that policy choice by a foreign
country.
The Federal Circuit continued down this flawed path by concluding that § 271(g) could be violated even when the use of the patented
process abroad was authorized." 3 According to the court, authorization was irrelevant; all that mattered was whether the sale, offer to
sell, or importation of the process's product into the United States
was unauthorized. " Analysis of infringement under § 271 (g) is thus
limited to (1) whether the process that was used was patented in the
United States, and (2) whether the product was sold, offered to be
sold, or imported without authorization in the United States. This
holding allows a U.S. patent to regulate extraterritorial behavior,
even if the patentee may have already authorized and been

Subsequently, however, the court held that § 271(g) does not apply to products imported
during the patent term if the products were made by the patented process before the patent
issued. See Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 252 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2001),
that in imposing liability for
vacated on other grounds, 535 U.S. 1109 (2002) ("We hold ...
selling or using products 'made by a process patented in the United States,' section 271(g)
requires that the patent be issued and in force at the time that the process is practiced and
the product is made."). The Federal Circuit reasoned that the statute requires a "process
patented in the United States," and before issuance, the process is not patented. Id. at 1318.
The court distinguished Bio-Technology on the grounds that the patent in that case was
already in force when the process was performed, although the statute was not in effect. Id.
Of course, this distinction is inapposite given that the Bio-Technology court concluded that
it was not applying the statute retroactively because the triggering act was the importation
of the item, not the use of the method. Bio-Technology, 80 F.3d at 1560. Consequently, the key
act for assessing infringement was the importation of the product, not the use of the process.
113. See Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
114. Id. at 1348 ("When the process used abroad is the same as the process covered by a
United States patent, liability for infringement arises only upon importation, sale or offers,
or use in the United States as set forth in § 271(g).").
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compensated for that behavior. Typically, authorized unconditional
sales by the patent holder exhaust the rights as to those particular
goods, eliminating the ability of the patent holder to sue subsequent
purchasers or users as infringers.11 5 Now, however, no exhaustion
would take place. Even if the party using the process overseas has
permission from the patent holder, subsequent purchasers or users
within the United States may still be liable for patent infringement,
potentially allowing the patentee double compensation for the single
use of the process.
d. Section 271(a)-FindingInfringement 'Within the United
States" Even IfSome Acts Occur Outside of the United States
The Federal Circuit's interpretation of § 271(a) is the most telling
of the court's expansive extraterritorial interpretation of the Patent
Act's infringement provisions. Section 271(a) contains the basic
exclusive rights afforded under a patent and particularly notes that
these rights are limited to acts "within the United States." ' 6 Even
this seemingly strict territorial provision has created considerable
ambiguity as to the extent to which a U.S. patent can reach overseas
activity. Originally, the provision only afforded the right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling an invention, but in 1994
Congress added § 271 to include "offers to sell" and "importation" of
an invention to satisfy the United States's obligations under
TRIPS.11 7 Congress provided no guidance as to the scope of this
provision or the meaning of this new form of infringement, save to
note that the sales of any offers must be completed during the
patent term in order for there to be infringement."'
Due to this new form of infringement and the ambiguities
surrounding it, the courts have had to confront whether an offer
made in the United States to sell a device abroad would infringe a

115. See, e.g., LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2006),
cert. granted sub non. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 28 (2007). The
Supreme Court will review the Federal Circuit's patent exhaustion doctrine in this case.
116. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
117. See Holbrook, Territoriality,supra note 4, at 722.
118. § 271(i).
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U.S. patent." 9 The district courts are currently split on this issue, 2 °
and the Federal Circuit so far has avoided expressly answering the
question. 121 Allowing there to be infringement when only the offer
and nothing else has been made would afford a U.S. patent significant extraterritorial reach. All of the physical acts of making and
using the device would occur outside the United States, yet there
would be liability.
More recently, and famously, the Federal Circuit addressed the
extraterritorial bounds of § 271(a) in NTP, Inc. v. Research in
Motion, Ltd. (NTP iI),122 otherwise known as the Blackberry case.
The invention at issue was a remote e-mail system that was
integrated into the user's computer-based e-mail system. 2 3 The
relevant patents contained both system and method claims.'2 4 The
accused infringer, Reseach in Motion (RIM), offered the Blackberry
system to users in the United States even though part of the system,
the relay, was physically located in Canada.'2 5
The Federal Circuit concluded that there was infringement.'2 6 In
analyzing the patent at issue, the court drew a distinction between
the method and system claims, addressing both the use and sale of
these types of claims. The court noted that § 271(a) is ambiguous as
to "how the territoriality requirement limits direct infringement

119. See generally Holbrook, Territoriality,supra note 4.
120. Compare Synaptic Pharm. Corp. v. MDS Panlabs, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 452, 462-63
(D.N.J. 2002), Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden Source Elecs., Ltd., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1167-71
(C.D. Cal. 2001), and Quality Tubing, Inc. v. Precision Tube Holdings Corp., 75 F. Supp. 2d
613, 618-21 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (finding no infringement if sale is outside U.S.), with SEB, S.A.
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 412 F. Supp. 2d 336, 342 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), Wesley Jessen
Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 228, 232-35 (D. Del. 2003), and Fieldturf, Inc.
v. Sw. Recreational Indus., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 708, 730-34 (E.D. Ky. 2002), dismissed on
standinggrounds,357 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (allowing infringement where ultimate sale
is outside U.S.).
121. See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1251-57 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Judge Newman would have concluded that offers in the United States to sell abroad cannot
constitute infringement of a U.S. patent. See id. at 1258 (Newman, J., concurring).
122. 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), superseding NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.
(NTP 1), 392 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
123. NTP II, 418 F.3d at 1289.
124. Id. at 1317-18.
125. Id. at 1290.
126. Id. at 1314-18. The court's reasoning shifted slightly from its first opinion. Originally,
the court did not rely upon the system-method dichotomy, central to its second decision. See
NTPI, 392 F.3d 1336.
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where the location of at least a part of the 'patented invention' is not
' The court provided
the same as the location of the infringing act."127
a more nuanced analysis of the various acts of infringement in §
271(a)-making, using, selling, or offering to sell-and the nature
of claims at issue-a system or method.'2 8
The court concluded that in this case there had been an infringing
use of the patented system.'2 9 Relying on precedent from the Court
of Claims, Decca Ltd. v. United States,3 ° the court held that the use
of an invention occurs in "the place at which the system as a whole
is put into service, i.e., the place where control of the system is
exercised and beneficial use of the system obtained."' 3 ' In contrast
to the use of a system, however, the court held that "a process
cannot be used 'within' the United States as required by section
271(a) unless each of the steps is performed within this country.' 3 2
Because one of the steps in this case was performed in Canada,
there was no use of the patented method and thus no infringe33
ment.1
The NTP H decision is striking on a number of levels. As a matter
of statutory construction, its differential application of § 271(a)'s
provisions to method and system claims runs contrary to the clear
language of the statute. Section 271(a) provides protection for inventions generally, and inventions are defined as being any process,

127. NTP II, 418 F.3d at 1315.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1282.
130. 544 F.2d 1070 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
131. NTP II, 418 F.3d at 1317.
132. Id. at 1318.
133. The court further reasoned that there were no sales or offers to sell the patented
method, but not on the basis of territorial limits. Instead the court concluded that Congress
did not intend inventions for methods to be infringed by sales or offers to sell. Id. at 1319-20.
Although the court declined to adopt a bright-line rule that method claims could never be
infringed by sales or offers to sell, the court reasoned that there was no infringement in the
present case:
We need not and do not hold that method claims may not be infringed under the
"sells" and "offers to sell" prongs of section 271(a). Rather, we conclude only that
RIM's performance of at least some of the recited steps of the asserted method
claims as a service for its customers cannot be considered to be selling or offering
to sell the invention covered by the asserted method claims. The sale or offer to
sell handheld devices is not, in and of itself, enough.
Id. at 1320-21.
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machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.13 ' Nothing in the
statute suggests that method claims should be treated differently
13
from other types of claims for the purposes of infringement. 1
Resort to the legislative history is only appropriate when the
statutory language is ambiguous, which it is not on this occasion.
The infringement provisions apply to inventions, and as defined by
the statute, inventions include methods. Indeed the court's methodology in interpreting § 271(a) is utterly inconsistent with its
applied to
approach to § 271(f), where it concluded that § 271(f)
36
"inventions" of all types, including patented methods.
Similarly, the bifurcated approach to explaining the "use" of an
invention belies the clear statutory structure. There is no reason
that "use" of a method should be viewed as different from the "use"
of a system. Under a traditional, strict territorial reading of patent
rights, the court should have concluded that, as all of the limitations
of the claim were not met within in the United States-be they
method or systems limitations-there should not have been
infringement.' 3 7
The NTP II decision represents an approach to issues of extraterritoriality that differs significantly from that of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court prefers to interpret the statute narrowly,
leaving the decision to expand the reach of U.S. patent laws to
Congress. In NTP II, the court, not Congress, performed this
expansion. Moreover, Decca, unlike NTP II, involved the U.S.
government and could be justified on the unique circumstances of
the federal government being an infringer of an invention that
necessitated extraterritorial aspects in order to function. At a
minimum, this case demonstrates, as has already been seen in
copyright and trademark law, that the traditional territorial

134. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining "Inventions patentable").
135. The court noted that there is no such distinction in the on-sale bar validity context for
methods and other claims, although some offers to sell methods might more appropriately be
viewed as licenses rather than invalidating offers to sell. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Risks of
Early Commercialization of an Invention: The On-Sale Bar to Patentability, in II
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 37, 45-46 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007).

136. See supra Part I.B.i.b.
137. Cf. Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 524 (1972) (finding
no infringement even though all of the components were manufactured in the United States,
since the completed device was never entirely built in the United States).

2154

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:2119

principles of patent law are beginning to erode in an increasingly
global marketplace.
2. Effects-based Approaches-Does the Conduct Affect the
United States?
The Federal Circuit, in some circumstances, has broadened the
reach of U.S. patent protection to cover acts outside of the United
States, although the court's jurisprudence lacks a consistent theory
that underlies this expansion. Commentators, recognizing this flaw,
have offered a number of generalized approaches to determining the
extraterritorial reach of a U.S. patent, offering some version of an
"effects-based" test.13 8 Under these approaches, there will be liability
for infringement of the U.S. patent if there is some sort of "effect" on
the market for the patented good within the United States.
This approach is similar to that used in trademark, antitrust, and
securities law. In antitrust law, for example, U.S. law "applies to
foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce
some substantial effect in the United States."13' 9 Securities law
operates similarly: U.S. law applies if there is an intent to produce
harm in the United States and an actual harm in the United States
results from those foreign acts. 4 ° The Supreme Court has used a
slightly narrower, but still effects-based methodology in trademark
law, to determine whether there is jurisdiction under the Lanham
Act. The Court identified three key factors: the effect on U.S.

138. See, e.g., Burk, Transborder,supra note 7, at 15 ("A statute based on this approach
would extend the force of United States law to electronic actions that affect U.S. interests,
regardless of the physical situs of the actor."); Osborne, supra note 7, at 611; Morris, supra
note 7, at 352 ("This paper argues that United States patent infringement cases should be
analyzed based on factors that determine the economic impact on the United States market
rather than based on the statutory technicalities of where each element is made, used, or
sold."); see also Chisum, supra note 4, at 608-09; Keyhani, supranote 7, at 65.
139. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993). Antitrust law, unlike
patent law, requires an intent and an actual harm. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal.
State Council of Contractors, 459 U.S. 519, 545 (1983).
140. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 988-89 (2d Cir. 1975);
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208-09 (2d Cir. 1968), overruled on othergrounds,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
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commerce, the citizenship of the offender, and the existence of
conflicts between American and foreign law.'
Suggestions along these lines in patent law have generally taken
two forms. One is an economically based effects test: if the foreign
activity affects the domestic market in some way, then U.S. law
should apply. A second approach is more technologically based: if
there is some aspect of the device or technology that is in the United
States, without a focus on the economic impact, then U.S. law
should apply.
Economically based effects tests determine whether to apply U.S.
patents to foreign activities based on the economic impact on the
United States.'4 2 The impact could be things such as lost sales or
decreased prices within the U.S. market as a result of the use of the
patented invention anywhere. The focus is not the physical location
of the acts of infringement, but instead on where the impact of that
infringement is felt. If the impact is in the U.S. market, then it
would be appropriate to enforce the U.S. patent against acts that
may have occurred in whole or in part outside of the United States.
In a global marketplace, relying only upon the economic impact
of the foreign activities would provide considerable extraterritorial
reach to U.S. patent law. Many U.S. patent holders operate on a
transnational level, so seemingly any activity abroad could have
implications for the U.S. market. The Blackberry case' 43 demonstrates the modern reality of activities crossing borders-sales of the
patented system and method undeniably impacted the market in
the United States. Concerns over drug reimportation plans and gray
market goods highlight that all markets are quite porous, and
activities outside of the U.S. market could easily impact the U.S.

141. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286-87 (1952). Different than the
approaches by the courts for patents, the trademark jurisprudence does account, on a limited
basis, for the potential for a conflict of laws.
142. See Chisum, supra note 4, at 608-09; Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Note, Divided
Infringement: Expanding the ExtraterritorialScope of PatentLaw, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281,30203 (2007). Morris has suggested the use of "territorial impact factors" as proxies for assessing
the economic impact on the United States. Morris, supra note 7, at 352. These factors are (1)
control, (2) beneficial use, and (3) ownership. Id. These factors, though, are not economic. As
these are not purely economic considerations (such as impact on prices or quantity of sales in
the U.S. market), I view this as more akin to a "technical" effects test.
143. NTP II, 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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market itself. If sales outside of the United States result in the
patent holder being forced to reduce prices in the United States,
then there has been an effect on the United States. Even without
imports, lower prices in other markets may create downward
pressure on prices within the United States.14 With global markets,
sales anywhere in the world could have an effect on the United
14
States, providing very broad extraterritorial protection. 1
Other proposed effects-based tests do not rely on the economic
impact on the U.S. market directly but instead focus on the nature
of the invention. In essence, a court is to determine the locus of the
infringement based on the use or characteristics of the patented
invention. Under these approaches, aspects of control and the
location of components factor heavily on whether U.S. law should
govern. The technological focus can act as a proxy, in some regards,
from pure economic considerations. Because of the focus on the
technology itself, as opposed to markets, I categorize these as
"technology-based" effects tests.
In essence, the Federal Circuit's approach in NTP II, by focusing
on the location of control and beneficial use, is such a technologybased approach.' 46 The focus under this approach is not necessarily
where the economic impact of the use takes place but instead a

144. See, e.g., Peter J. Hammer, Differential Pricingof Essential AIDS Drugs: Markets,
Politicsand PublicHealth,5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 883, 893-94 (2002) (discussing reference pricing,
and noting that "even without the threat of physical arbitrage, implicitly revealing
information in the very act of setting lower prices in developing countries could lead to an
unraveling of high prices in developed countries" (footnote omitted)).
145. Wasserman proposes six comity-based factors to limit this potential reach, drawn from
the Ninth Circuit's trademark jurisprudence. Wasserman, supranote 142, at 303-04. Included
in these factors is the "relative impact within the United States as compared with the impact
elsewhere." Id. at 304. Although commendable in her concern for comity, it is unclear whether
this factor is relative to the size of the market in the foreign country or is an absolute factor.
See id. at 305 (noting that "[iun making this determination, the size of markets in America
versus abroad should be considered," suggesting that this factor would be scaled in some way
to account for the differing sizes between the United States and a foreign market). For
example, the impact on the Hungarian market likely would be much smaller in an absolute
sense than the United States simply because the Hungarian market is so much smaller. In
contrast, the impact on a per capita or some other relative basis could be much larger. If the
size of the foreign market is not taken into account, this factor would be no obstacle for
application of a U.S. patent extraterritorially because the impact in an absolute sense would
likely be greater than the impact on these smaller markets, although the relative impact could
be different.
146. See NTP II, 418 F.3d at 1317.
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technical assessment of where and by whom the invention is being
controlled and used.
One commentator has suggested a variant of a technology-based
effects test that focuses on specific components of the patented
invention. This approach would identify the geographic location of
the "patentably distinctive" aspects of the invention.147 These
components would be those that distinguish the patented device
from those in the prior art, and the location of these parts governs
whose law applies.'4 8 If the patentably distinctive aspects are found
within the United States, then infringement under a U.S. patent
would be appropriate. This approach thus focuses on the technology,
but allows extraterritorial enforcement of a U.S. patent.
3. The Advantages and Disadvantagesof Effects-based
Approaches
The effects-based tests provide considerable protection to U.S.
patent holders. Because the focus is the economic impact on the U.S.
markets, these approaches could protect the patent holder effectively in a global market. These approaches afford broad protection
for patent holders against any activity outside of the United States
that impacts the U.S. market, which does not provide much of a
limit.
All of the effects tests suffer from considerable flaws, however.
The proposals fail to provide a metric for discerning when the
relevant effect is sufficient to trigger a U.S. patent. For example, for
the economically based approaches, the courts could use either a
threshold or a cost-benefit approach. Under a threshold approach,
some minimum threshold level of impact must be crossed to trigger
U.S. law, regardless of the countervailing economic impact on the
foreign jurisdiction. Defining how much is "enough" can be difficult
if the threshold must be some non-trivial level. " 9 Alternatively,
147. See Osborne, supra note 7, at 611.
148. Id. Osborne reaches this approach by interpreting Decca differently than the Federal
Circuit in NTP I1. Id. at 610-11. The opinion in Decca never expressly articulates this test and
eschews the use of any bright-line tests. See Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1083
(Ct. Cl. 1976) ("This conclusion does not rest on any one factor but on the combination of
circumstances here present ....").
149. The federal circuit courts are split on this issue as it relates to trademark law. Some
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courts could balance the economic impact in the United States
against the economic consequences in the foreign jurisdiction. If the
impact is greater in the foreign jurisdiction, the lawsuit should be
brought there. Such an approach is rather difficult to assess,
particularly because it requires courts to measure complex economic
considerations, not merely legal questions.
The technology-based effects tests suffer from a similar problem
in that they fail to provide a metric for discerning when application
of a U.S. patent is appropriate. Under the Federal Circuit's "control
and beneficial use" test, for example, the court failed to clarify how
much control or benefit must lie within the United States.1 50 Similar
to the economically based effects test, the Federal Circuit could
require a threshold approach or a balancing approach. One could
view NTP H either as requiring all control and beneficial use to lie
within the United States, or as an exercise in balancing the various
interests of the relevant countries. The absence of any consideration
of Canadian interests in the case, however, suggests that the court
was focusing exclusively on acts within the United States. The court
did not use a balancing test of any sort. The same problem arises for
the "beneficial use" aspect of the test: whether all or merely some of
the beneficial use must lie within the United States. Alternatively,
courts could apply a balancing test that measures the benefit within
the United States against that outside of the United States,
declining to apply U.S. law when the benefit is greater outside of the
United States. The Federal Circuit has provided no answers to these
questions.
A hypothetical demonstrates the problems with this approach.
Imagine a computer system for streaming videos in which the owner
of the webpage only uploads the movies, and customers purchase
the right to stream the movie. Assume that the owner of the

courts, such as the Second Circuit, require a "substantial" effect on U.S. commerce, mirroring
the test used to distinguish interstate from intrastate commerce. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills,
Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956). The Ninth Circuit instead requires only
an effect because the "substantial effect" test is irrelevant to the Foreign Commerce Clause.
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428 (9th Cir. 1977). The First
Circuit requires a substantial effect only if the accused infringer is not a U.S. citizen; because
Congress can regulate the acts of U.S. citizens abroad, the substantial effect test does not
apply if the infringer is a U.S. citizen. McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 121 (lst Cir. 2005).
150. NTP II, 418 F.3d at 1317.
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webpage uploads from Hungary all of the videos, but U.S. users can
join the service and stream the movies. If the owner of a patent
that covers this system attempted to assert infringement, there
could be difficulty in identifying the locus of control. The users could
be viewed as exercising control, per the NTP H decision, because
they access the system and determine which movies they will watch.
Likewise, the webpage owner exercises control by providing the
various movies. The users, however, cannot upload anything, so the
webpage owner exercises control in a different way. Moreover, users
would be spread throughout the world, so even though some of the
beneficial use would be within the United States, the NTP II test 5 '
does not address whether use outside of the United States would
also be relevant. Would the "beneficial use" aspect of the test be
satisfied simply because some of the users lie within the United
States, even if a far greater number are outside of the United
States, or would the court balance the foreign users against the
U.S. users to assess where the beneficial use lies? The court offers
no clarification as to either of these aspects of the "control and
beneficial use" test. 152 Moreover, the Hungarian owner of the
webpage benefits economically by receiving income from his
customers. It is unclear whether the benefit to the webpage owner
would be "beneficial use" and how the test accounts for that
dynamic. Thus, under the "control and beneficial use" test, there is
no metric as to how much of the system must be in the United
States to satisfy the standard articulated. Nor is it clear who must
control the system and to whom the benefit must run.'5 3 The
standard therefore remains fatally ambiguous.
Similarly, while the "patentably distinctive" test'54 appears to be
an elegant solution to the issue of extraterritoriality, nowhere is

151. Id.

152. The conspicuous failure to assess interests outside of the United States again suggests
that the former is all that would be required, and uses outside the United States would not
be relevant in the court's calculus.
153. See O'Leary Smith, supra note 7, at 458 (noting ambiguity of "beneficial use test").
O'Leary Smith nevertheless advocates for elimination of the "control" aspect of the Federal
Circuit's test, which would result in even greater extraterritorial scope to U.S. patents. She
recognizes that such an expansion risks creating comity issues, but nothing in her analysis
suggests when such comity concerns should, if ever, enter a court's analysis. See id.
154. See Osborne, supra note 7, at 589.
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"patentably distinctive" defined. It is not a term of art in patent law.
Moreover, the author of a notable article on the test also fails to
explain the contours of relevant evidence to make this determination.'5 5 Is it the aspect of the invention that provides novelty or
nonobviousness? Is the patentee bound by representations made to
the patent office, even if later proven false, or only to arguments
proffered by the examiner? Can expert testimony be used to counter
the public record? All of these open questions belie the test's facial
simplicity. Indeed, there could be multiple aspects of the invention
that distinguish it from the prior art. This test provides no answer
as to which law governs if those two aspects are in different
countries. The genius of an invention may be the actual combination
of previously known components. 156 For example, the creation of
Post-It Notes® 5 7 involved the use of two known elements: an
adhesive and paper. When the combination is key to the invention,
the system as a whole would be the "patentably distinctive" aspect
of the invention, and there would be no single geographic location
for the patentably distinctive part. The proposed test would not
provide an answer. The entire concept of a particular "patentably
distinctive" aspect of an invention harkens back to the rejected
concept of the "heart" or "gist" of the invention. 55 There need not be
a singular, defining feature of an invention that is key to its
patentability, which renders this test difficult, if not impossible, to
apply.
More importantly, nearly all of these effects-based tests focus
exclusively on the impact on U.S. markets and ignore the intellectual property policies of the relevant foreign countries. 9 Although

155. See id.
156. See Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 357 F.3d 1270, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
157. U.S. Patent No. 5,194,299 (filed Dec. 31, 1986).
158. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 345 (1961)
C'Mhere is no legally recognizable or protected 'essential' element, 'gist' or 'heart' of the
invention in a combination patent.").
159. One exception is the proposal by Wasserman, who would incorporate a variety of
comity-based factors into her analysis. See Wasserman, supra note 142, at 303-06. Her
proposal, however, is limited to transnational systems such as the NTP II case and does not
provide a generalized methodology for addressing all extraterritorial issues. See id. at 309
("To solve the problem of divided infringement, this Note proposes adopting a substantial
effects test, constrained by comity concerns."). Her comity factors also differ considerably from
the analysis offered in this Article and do not make a conflict with foreign patent law or

2008]

EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN U.S. PATENT LAW

2161

TRIPS has afforded a certain level of harmonization, it still grants
flexibility for countries to afford higher protection or to exclude
protection for certain inventions. 6 ° Allowing the mere effect on U.S.
markets to generate liability for acts that would not infringe within
that country would undermine those policies and that nation's
sovereignty. Accordingly, a truly economically driven effects test
would extend the reach of a U.S. patent to the four corners of the
globe, undermining the various policies in place in other countries
and providing considerable-and inappropriate-reach to a U.S.
patent.
The Federal Circuit's decision in NTP II demonstrates this
problem. The Federal Circuit failed to consider the Canadian
government's interest in the acts occurring within its territory.'6 '
The Canadian government filed amicus briefs at the Federal Circuit
decrying this oversight:
The reissued panel opinion lacks any acknowledgement or
discussion of the effect of, or the effect upon, long-established
international understandings and agreements regarding
national jurisdiction over intellectual property ....
Explicit

articulation of such principles will not merely facilitate the
evolution of international intellectual property law, nor simply
satisfy the Supreme Court's admonition in F. Hoffman-LaRoche,
Ltd. v.Empagran,S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004), to
address such matters in statutory construction analyses when
potential issues of extraterritoriality are implicated, but also
avoid what otherwise could appear to some as a unilateral
assertion of patent infringement jurisdiction, justified solely in

ownership determinative. See id. at 304 ("Nonetheless, this should not be a dispositive factor
because patent law differs substantially from country to country."). Some of these factors,
such as the intent of the infringer, are subjective and difficult for either patent holders or
potential competitors to assess ex ante.
160. See generally TRIPS, supra note 8.
161. See id. In this regard, the Federal Circuit's opinion is inconsistent with the precedent
upon which it was based, Decca Ltd. u. United States, 544 F.2d 1070 (Ct. Cl. 1976). The Court
of Claims recognized that part of its decision was based on the fact that there was no conflict
of foreign law. Id. at 1074 ("Neither is there a probable conflict with the patent laws of other
countries."). The Court of Claims, therefore, at least acknowledged the potential for a conflict
of laws, which the Federal Circuit ignored.
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terms of national law, over the technology of a trans-national

system. 162
The Canadian government therefore recognized the conspicuous
absence of any thought as to the international dimension of the
case. The government carefully refrained from saying that the
decision was wrong, instead emphasizing that the court's failure to
explicitly consider Canada's interest was methodologically infirm.
The NTP H decision is a Solomonic effort to apply a strict
territorial rule in one regard for method claims, and a technologybased effects test in another regard for systems claims, basing
infringement on the use of the system, rather than the construction
of the system itself. In both instances, the opinion generally fails in
its efforts by offering both an overly tortured interpretation of
§ 271(a)163 and by relying on a boundless "control and beneficial use"
test.
C. Neither Strict TerritorialityNor Effects-based Tests Are
Satisfactory
Neither a strict territorial approach nor a broad "effects" test is
satisfying. These approaches to extraterritoriality contain significant flaws. A strict territorial approach is true to the presumption
against applying United States laws outside the territorial United
States, thus facilitating comity and reducing the risk of an affront
to the sovereignty of another country. Of course, the strict approach
means that either Congress will have to act retrospectively to close
a hole in the laws-which necessarily means that protection for
some patents will already have slipped-or the courts will be forced
to articulate strained interpretations of statutory provisions as the
Federal Circuit did in Eolas,'" AT&T, 6 5 and NTP I.66 Moreover,

162. Brief for the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petition of
Research in Motion, Ltd. for Rehearing En Banc, NTP II, 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19,
2005) (No. 03-1615).
163. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
164. Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
165. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, Microsoft Corp.
v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
166. NTP II, 418 F.3d 1282.
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the focus of the various extraterritorial statutory provisions is
entirely on the United States; under a plain reading of those
provisions and as interpreted by the Federal Circuit, courts give no
consideration of potential countervailing interests of the countries
in which the relevant activities occur. Instead, the focus is myopically on the United States only.
An effects approach allows the tailoring of patent law to protect
U.S. inventors but ignores the implication of such holdings on
activities in foreign countries. The U.S.-centric approach undermines the policies and sovereignty of foreign countries that may not
provide protection to an inventor for a variety of legitimate reasons.
There is little to no consideration of the interest or concerns of those
other countries. These proposals are in sharp contrast to another
area of intellectual property, trademark law, where the Supreme
Court and circuit courts of appeal consider potential conflicts of law
as relevant in assessing whether there is jurisdiction over the cause
of action.'6 7
The failure to consider the interests of the relevant foreign
countries is universal to all of the above approaches, and all the
approaches suggested by commentators. Part II explores this
oversight and proffers a unique, previously unarticulated approach
that explicitly balances the interests of the United States with those
of the country that is implicated by the infringing activity.
II. A NEW APPROACH-EXPRESSLY CONSIDERING FOREIGN
PATENT LAW
The glaring flaw in all of the effects-based approaches is their
failure to take into account foreign patent law. Countries can differ
significantly on these issues. For example, although the United
States has taken a broad view of eligible subject matter for patents,
others have not been as receptive, denying patents on higher-order

167. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo
Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428 (9th Cir. 1977) (adopting jurisdictional rule of reason test that
considers comity and conflict of laws); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633,
642-43 (2d Cir. 1956). The First Circuit treats issues of comity as pertinent only to "questions
of whether a court should, in its discretion, decline to exercise subject matter jurisdiction that
it already possesses." McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 111 (1st Cir. 2005).
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living animals,'6 8 computer software,' 6 9 and business methods.'7 °
Other countries provide more rigorous protection for parties who
begin to use an invention before the patent issues.' 7 ' An approach
to extraterritoriality that ignores these substantial differences has
the potential to create significant conflicts of law and potentially can
undermine the sovereignty of countries whose views of patent law
differ from the United States.' 2 In contrast, restricting patents
strictly to the territorial United States is overinclusive, denying
protection for a U.S. patent holder even in circumstances where
there would be no conflict with foreign law. The mere potential for
a conflict, not an actual conflict, means that the patent holder will
be denied protection. This approach is also fundamentally flawed.
The time has come for a uniform approach to these territorial
issues, instead of the haphazard analyses that the above cases
have taken. A uniform, consistent means of addressing territorial
concerns, absent from the case law or the literature, is an approach
that balances the interests of the U.S. patent holder and the
interests of the affected country. This novel approach could be used
in lieu of further modifications for Congress or, more narrowly, as
an implementation of the extraterritorial reach of § 271.1'7 Indeed,
it would alleviate the need for Congress to serially enact measures

168. See, e.g., Harvard Coll. v. Canada (Comm'r of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45, para. 155
(Can.) ("I am not satisfied that the definition of 'invention' ... is sufficiently broad to include
higher life forms."). See generallyMargo A. Bagley, Patent First,Ask QuestionsLater:Morality
and Biotechnology in PatentLaw, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 469, 528-29 (2003).
169. See European Patent Convention pt. II, ch. 1, art. 52(2)(c), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S.
272.
170. See id.
171. See Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really
Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1302 (2003). At present, the U.S. provides prior user
rights for only business method patents. 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2000).
172. For an outstanding discussion of the use of foreign law to interpret domestic
intellectual property laws, see Edward Lee, The New Canon: Using or MisusingForeignLaw
To Decide Domestic Intellectual Property Claims, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2005). Robins's
proposal would consider foreign law as well, although only at the primary level of subject
matter eligibility. See Robins, supra note 10, at 1310-13. Her proposal, however, only
considers foreign patent law as it relates to subject matter eligibility requirements as
articulated under TRIPS and not a given country's application of particular patentability
principles, such as inventive step (obviousness) or, importantly, potential differences in the
ownership of the patent. See id. at 1312-13. These potential conflicts create strong reasons to
decline to apply U.S. law extraterritorially.
173. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
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to close perceived loopholes in the territorial nature of U.S. patent
rights.
This Article's proposal would require U.S. courts to explicitly
contemplate foreign patent law. The basic premise is that, for there
to be infringement of a U.S. patent, the patent holder would also
have to show that there would be infringement in the foreign
jurisdiction. If that is the case, then the harm from extraterritorially
enforcing the U.S. patent is mitigated significantly. On the other
hand, if there is some reason that infringement would not be found
in the foreign country, then infringement should not be found under
U.S. law. By explicitly contemplating possible differences in the law,
this comparative approach guards against creating such conflicts
and preserving these distinctions. American courts would therefore
explore the foreign country's patent law, analyzing issues of patent
validity and infringement.
This approach-in essence making the enforceability of a U.S.
right contingent on the availability of that right in a foreign
country-is not unprecedented. A variant can be seen in the field
of criminal law. A country may want to prosecute someone who
committed a crime within that country but who resides elsewhere.
In order to obtain jurisdiction over the person, the country will have
to request extradition of the suspect from the current country of
residence.' 74 One basis for the resident country to decline the
request is that the charged offense is not a crime in the resident
country.' The dual criminality principle requires that the activities
of the accused constitute a crime in both jurisdictions for extradition
to be appropriate, even if the acts occurred only in one of the
countries. 7 ' The ability to extradite a suspect is therefore contingent on substantive foreign law. This requirement is found in many
extradition treaties 77 and serves a variety of political purposes,

174. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 475 (1986).
175. See id. § 476(1)(c) ("A person sought for prosecution or for enforcement of a sentence
will not be extradited ... if the offense with which he is charged or of which he has been
convicted is not punishable as a serious crime in both the requesting and the requested state
176. Id.
177. SeeJonathan 0. Hafen, Comment, InternationalExtradition:Issues Arising Under the
Dual Criminality Requirement, 1992 BYU L. REV. 191, 195; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3181(b)(1)
(2000) (requiring "evidence ... presented by the foreign government that indicates that had the
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such as protecting a country's residents from unfair prosecution
abroad and providing reciprocity between contracting nations.'V Of
course, in extradition, the foreign court decides its own law, so the
U.S. court would not be required to ascertain that foreign law." 9 But
the use of foreign law as a contingency to the application of U.S. law
is nevertheless not unprecedented. 0
Under this proposal, the extraterritorial enforcement of a patent
would be permissible only when the relevant acts would also
constitute infringement in the relevant foreign country or countries.
If the acts would not be infringing in the foreign country, then there
will be no infringement of the U.S. patent, just as there would be no
extradition of the accused.'"' This proposal differs from the duality
principle in that it is substantive. The duality principle in criminal
law only implicates the ability of a country to deny extradition and
not the substance of the underlying crime; once extradited, the
accused would be prosecuted under the law of the state that had

offenses been committed in the United States, they would constitute crimes of violence ....
");
Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Peru, art. II, sec. 1, July 26,2001,2001 U.S.T. LEXIS 94 ("An offense
shall be an extraditable offense if it is punishable under the laws in both Contracting States
by deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of more than one year or by a more severe
penalty."); Ordinola v. Hackman, 478 F.3d 588, 594 n.7 (4th Cir. 2007) ('The dual criminality
requirement ensures that the charged conduct is considered criminal and punishable as a
felony in both the country requesting the suspect and the country surrendering the suspect.").
178. See Hafen, supranote 177, at 194-95. The dual criminality principle also shares some
of the problems of this Article's proposal, such as the ability of courts to discern foreign law
and the institutional competence of the courts vis-A-vis the executive. Compare id. at 196-97
("Courts began to defer to executive decisions regarding the desireability [sic] of extradition,
due both to the increasing complexity of ascertaining violations of two nations' laws and
judicial recognition of the executive's role in establishing foreign policy."), with supra notes
159-63 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties in assessing foreign patent law and
institutional competency of the courts).
179. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 476 cmt. d. (1986).
180. Another approach could be to have U.S. courts certify questions of foreign patent law
to the relevant jurisdiction's highest court, similar to what occurs within the U.S. federal
system. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (2000); see also 4 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 57 (2007);
Rivkin v. Century 21 Texan Realty LLC, 494 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2007). While this approach
would have the benefit of having a foreign court interpret its own law, such referral would
require a treaty or other agreement. The proposed system could be adopted by the United
States without the need to complete such a complex agreement. See Dinwoodie, supra note
3, at 552 (discussing "international agreements and practices, national and regional laws,
developing post-national groupings, and conflicts values").
181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 476(1)(c) (1986).
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requested extradition. 18 2 Regardless, it provides an example of
where differences in national laws can have a considerable impact
on the ability to enforce a given country's laws.
This solution originates in part from the literature on choice
of law and conflicts of law. Generally, when activity implicates
multiple states or countries, courts are confronted with the issue of
which state's (in the domestic context) or country's (in the international context) law to apply.18 3 These methods typically result in the
selection of a particular jurisdiction's law to address the issue.
Although choice of law doctrine has been criticized, courts often
perform an interest analysis, applying the law of the jurisdiction
that has the greatest "interest" in the litigation, however that
"interest" is measured."M Consequently, the question generally is
which law to apply. The approach articulated here is different in
that it does not seek to choose a certain country's law to apply.
Instead, it applies all of the relevant law, and if there would be an
inconsistent result under any of that law, then there is no liability
for infringement of the U.S. patent.
This method accords due respect to the variances that exist
among nations regarding patent law. The comparative method also
facilitates a greater dialogue on patent law and standards between
various countries. This dialogue has the potential to lead to the
development of international patent law norms; it could also serve
to identify points of considerable disagreement between countries
which may need to be the source of future, political negotiations.
Given the generally slow process of treaty negotiations and their
inability to adapt to ever-evolving technologies, use of a judicial
colloquy could help establish international norms that could reduce
the transaction costs for international actors.18 5 This private law
lever could act as an important and powerful supplement to the
public law mechanisms.

182. Id. § 476 cmt. d.
183. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). The term "state," as used
in the Restatement, "denotes a territorial unit with a distinct general body of law." Id. § 3.
184. See, e.g., In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992)
('The federal common law choice-of-law rule is to apply the law of the jurisdiction having the
greatest interest in the litigation." (citing Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 936 F.2d
723, 726-27 (2d Cir. 1991))).
185. Dinwoodie, supranote 3, at 492-93.
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Of course, taken too far, a balancing approach could swallow all
possible predictability in intellectual property law. One approach
under the auspices of a balancing methodology would be to take into
account all relevant national policies, international treaties, and
other potential norms in a "totality of the circumstances" approach.
A court could then articulate an outcome that balances and best
effectuates these various policies. Of course, the resulting rule
could be one that is not present in any given state's patent laws.
Moreover, predicting the outcome of such an approach would be
difficult. The uncertainty that attends such an approach would be
detrimental to the business community, which dislikes risks and
prefers certainty in planning. Indeed, it would undermine the
perceived benefits of providing a more concise means for these
businesses to operate in a global marketplace. Finally, if confronted
with such a myriad of sources, U.S. courts may be tempted to stick
with the familiar-American law-and thus lawsuit outcomes may
be skewed towards U.S.-driven outcomes as opposed to a careful
consideration of international and foreign laws. This bias would risk
undermining the benefit of the balancing approach. 8
As such, I eschew that variant of the comparative approach and
articulate particular factors that would be relevant in assessing
the application of U.S. patent law. These factors could be viewed as
presumptions, in a softer version of this method, or as absolute
requirements, acting a bit harshly but providing somewhat more
8 7 The approach I articulate here is the hard versioncertainty."

186. In the copyright context, Professor Graeme Dinwoodie has argued for this type of
approach. Dinwoodie has recognized that courts, in applying this approach, ultimately could
use a substantive legal rule that exists in no country at all but instead is the result of
balancing a variety of concerns. See id. at 542-43 ("[A] court faced with an international
copyright dispute would not necessarily apply the copyright law of a single state to the
contested issues. Instead, it would consider whether the international dimension implicated
policies of other states or the international copyright system, and develop (and apply) a
substantive rule of copyright law that best effectuates this range of policies." (footnotes
omitted)). I have previously criticized this approach in relation to patent law. See Holbrook,
Territoriality,supranote 4, at 752, 757-58. Those criticisms are equally appropriate here.
187. See Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court: Common Law JudgingVersus
Error Correctionin the Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 325 n.215 (2006) ("And
indeed, creating presumptions is another mechanism that the Court might use to provide
more guidance to the lower courts in standard-governed areas of law."); cf. Timothy R.
Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-basedFormalism in Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 123, 132 (2005).
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that satisfaction of the various conditions is necessary for extraterritorial application of a U.S. patent.
The following analysis provides a structured methodology for
courts to follow when deciding whether to apply a U.S. patent to
foreign conduct. The steps in the analysis help a court determine
whether application of U.S. law would be appropriate. Figure 1
shows a flowchart of these steps, demonstrating how they interrelate.
Figure 1
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A. Is There Some Nexus to the United States?
First, for allegedly infringing acts to implicate a U.S. patent,
necessarily there must be some sort of connection to the United
States.' This requirement effects a degree of localization for the
cause of action: some aspect of the act must be geographically
connected to the United States. In order to assess which patent is
implicated, there must be some nexus to a given jurisdiction. Absent
a localization principle, courts would not know which patents to
evaluate."19
In order to evaluate whether there is a nexus to the United
States, one can think of patent infringement as an attempt by the
infringer to appropriate the invention, either physically or commercially. 9 ° This prong of the test would ask whether there was an
attempt to appropriate the invention within the United States in
some way, physically or commercially. Generally, the case law and
statute already have identified acts that would qualify: importation,
exportation, offers to sell in the United States where the completed
sale will be outside of the United States, and uses of part of a
system in the United States with part outside of the United
States. 19' Importantly, this list is not exhaustive-the courts are
free to identify other situations where there is a sufficient nexus to
the United States. Uses of a patented system within the United
States by U.S. citizens would be sufficient to satisfy this condition,
such as the hypothetical scenarios posed in criticizing the NTP II
standard.'9 2 If there is an arguable attempt to appropriate the
invention with some connection to the United States-either
commercial or physical-then this factor should be satisfied.

188. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000)).
189. This need contrasts with copyright law, where the comparison is between two different
works, rather than a government issued patent right. See Dinwoodie, supra note 3, at 534-35
(arguing against a localization principle in copyright law). Thus, in copyright, the need for
localization is not as significant-courts simply compare the two works. In patent law,
however, the comparison is to the patent's claims, not simply the invention.
190. See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 26, at 805.
191. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)-(g) (2000); see also Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr v. Schubert & Salzer Maschinenfabrik
Aktiengesellschaft, 903 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
192. See supraPart I.B.3.
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This condition, however, is not an "effects test" by another name.
The nexus must be greater than merely an impact on the market.
There must be a physical or commercial attempt to appropriate
the invention with a tie to the United States. Mere indirect
economic impacts on price within the United States, for example,
would not be sufficient. The focus is on the invention, not the
market. Moreover, this factor is not alone a sufficient condition for
applying U.S. law, in sharp contrast to the effects-based approaches
articulated above. This factor is merely a threshold determination
necessary to determine whether the court should even consider
applying U.S. law.
B. Ignoring TerritorialLines, Would the U.S. Patent Be Infringed?
If there is some sort of domestic nexus, then the U.S. patent
holder would have to demonstrate that, ignoring territorial limits,
the accused device would infringe the U.S. patent. For example, in
the NTP II case, the patent holder would have had to demonstrate
that, ignoring the fact that part of the system was in Canada, the
accused device would infringe the system and method claims of the
U.S. patent. If there is no infringement of the U.S. patent in this
context, then there is no reason to consider extending the rights of
the patents outside of the territorial United States.
Such an approach is not at all unprecedented. Courts perform this
precise analysis when applying § 271(f) and (g).' 93 In both of those
provisions, the patent claim must read on the accused device or
process, but the accused device in both cases is outside of the United
States. For § 271(f), the potential assembly of the completed device
is outside of the United States, and for § 271(g), the process is being
performed outside of the United States. For there to be infringement, however, these external activities must satisfy each and every
limitation of the claimed invention, notwithstanding
their use or
194
existence outside of the United States.

193. See supra Parts I.A.1, I.A.2.b.
194. This requirement is comparable to the Copyright Act's restrictions in the importation
of infringing phonorecords. Such importation is precluded if the work otherwise would violate
the copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 602 (2000).
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Also contained within the analysis of whether the U.S. patent
would be infringed is an analysis of whether the U.S. patent is valid
and enforceable under U.S. law. If the patent is invalid or unenforceable, then the case is over-there would be no infringement. If
there would be infringement of the valid and enforceable patent,
however, then the court must consider the implicated foreign
patents and patent law.
C. Does the U.S. Patentee Have a Patent in the Relevant Country?
Because the infringing conduct applies not only to the United
States but also to a foreign country, a critical element in the
analysis is whether the conduct would also be viewed as infringing
in the foreign country. In order to make that assessment, however,
courts need to identify who, if anyone, actually owns a patent on the
invention in the relevant country or countries. The issues relevant
in this approach will vary if the U.S. patent holder does or does not
have a patent in that country. The existence, or lack, of a foreign
patent will not preclude application of U.S. law, but it does affect
the nature of the balancing to be done. In essence, this question
represents a split in the analytical chain to be used here.
1. The PatenteeHas Patents in All Relevant Countries
If the patentee has patents in the relevant countries that cover
the accused device, then concerns about usurping the law and policy
of those countries are mitigated to a great extent. Generally, if the
patent has issued, there will not be large policy conflicts in the
litigation. Although any individual patent may be invalid, the
existence of patents reduces the risk that the country has a
sweeping policy against patenting certain subject matter, such as
business methods, software, or human genes.
An issue could arise under this assessment when the U.S. patent
holder possesses an intellectual property right akin to a U.S. patent
but which is not truly a "patent" as we think of them in the United
States or under our international obligations. For example, some
countries provide intellectual property rights to protect industrial
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designs and for less significant technological advances.19 5 One option
would be for the court to conclude that such intellectual property
protection does not count as a "patent," and the analysis would
continue as if the U.S. patent holder did not have a patent in the
relevant countries. Alternatively, the court could perform a
functional analysis to determine whether the rights provided in the
foreign country are sufficiently similar to a patent to allow application of this methodology. If the court finds the rights are sufficiently
analogous, then the court would proceed as if the U.S. patent holder
has rights in the foreign country. This latter approach, however,
would create some uncertainty and difficulty in comparing the
nature of the rights afforded these various intellectual properties.
As such, I would have the courts simply treat the presence of nonpatent protection as a lack of patent protection in the relevant
country. Because failure to have foreign patent protection is not
fatal to an infringement suit under this proposed methodology, the
U.S. patent holder may yet be granted protection, and the difficulty
in assessing the relatedness of the various types of protection would
be avoided.
Of course, having patents in all of the relevant countries also
means that the patent owner could sue in those other countries. One
advantage of the proposed approach, however, is that it mitigates
the need for piecemeal litigation for patent holders. 9 ' Requiring
patentees to sue in each and every country to enforce their patents
is costly and incredibly difficult. Moreover, even having patents in
all relevant countries may not eliminate territoriality concerns,
particularly if the system crosses national boundaries. It would be
possible for such divided claims to still evade the patent system of
both countries if those countries generally use a strict territorial

195. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 8, arts. 25-26 (discussing industrial designs); In re
Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1036-38 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (discussing design-like protection under
German Geschmacksmusters); IP Australia, The Innovation Patent, http://www.ipaustralia.
gov.au/patents/whatinnovation.shtml (last visited Mar. 29, 2008) (discussing Australia's
"innovation patents" for innovations not "sufficiently inventive" to meet "the inventive
threshold required for standard patents").
196. Another option for patent holders to streamline litigation would be to sue in one court
for infringement of all patents, domestic and foreign. The Federal Circuit has foreclosed this
option by prohibiting U.S. district courts from hearing claims of infringement of foreign
patents. See Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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approach to patent law. Thus, even owning patents in all of the
countries relevant in the dispute does not guarantee that the patent
owner will be able to bring suit within a given country. For example,
suppose that the Blackberry system had components in both
Canada and Mexico. Likely, the patent holder could not successfully
sue in Canada or Mexico because the system straddles multiple
jurisdictions. The infringer would be immunized from liability in
any country.
If the patent holder has patents in all of the relevant countries,
the courts should respect the validity of the foreign patents. While
a court can obviously invalidate the U.S. patent, which would
preclude any infringement at all and thus would still act as a
complete defense, the courts generally should be hesitant to assess
the validity of a foreign patent. 197 Patents, as grants from national
governments, are vested with a considerable amount of sovereignty
from the granting nation. A U.S. court's assessment of the validity
of the patent risks undermining the authority of a different,
sovereign country. In essence, a U.S. court would be telling the
foreign patent office that it did not know how to apply its own law.
Therefore, the U.S. court should treat the foreign patent as valid.
A variation of this proposal would allow an accused infringer to
challenge the foreign patent's validity (although the effect would not
be to truly invalidate the patent because U.S. courts lack that
authority).19 Consideration of the validity of the foreign patent
under foreign law is possible under this methodology, although it
does greatly complicate the litigation. Not only would the validity of
the U.S. patent be in dispute but also that of the foreign patent,
creating multiple invalidity issues. In order to assess the validity of
the foreign patent, the court would have to know the standards for
validity in the various countries and the standards for prior art,
which could differ. Countries may have varying degrees of grace
periods for applicants or may adhere to a strict view of first-to-file

197. Cf. id. at 902 ("[A] patent right to exclude only arises from the legal right granted and
recognized by the sovereign within whose territory the right is located. It would be
incongruent to allow the sovereign power of one to be infringed or limited by another
sovereign's extension of its jurisdiction.").
198. Such an analysis will be done under this proposal if there is no patent in the relevant
country. See infra Part II.C.2.c.
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novelty and inventive step. Allowing collateral challenges to the
foreign patent would therefore increase the complexity of the
domestic litigation. Although there is reason to believe that U.S.
courts should not have significant difficulty in interpreting foreign
law, given the general levels of harmonization on issues of validity,
the resulting complexity and assault on the sovereign act of a
foreign country counsel against allowing a challenge to the foreign
patent. 199 Instead, it is preferable to have a presumption that the
foreign patents are valid.
2. The Patentee Does Not Have Patents in All Relevant
Countries
Possessing a patent in all the countries of interest would not
be a prerequisite to applying U.S. law extraterritorially. In the
circumstance that the U.S. patent holder does not have patents in
every relevant country, then the analysis becomes more complicated. There are a variety of legitimate reasons for why a U.S.
patentee may not have obtained patent protection in the relevant
countries. For one, given that patent rights are still territorially
based, obtaining a patent in every country could be prohibitively
costly. Moreover, if infringers are in fact using the territorial limits
of patents to arbitrage the system, they could readily choose jurisdictions where patent holders are unlikely to file because the ex
ante potential for return to the patentee from that market may not
justify expending the resources to obtain patent protection. Thus,
this approach affords a level of fairness to the patentee in an
increasingly global marketplace.
This does mean, of course, that there may be infringement for
acts taking place in a "patent free zone," but the requirement for
some nexus to the United States limits the extension of U.S. law to
some degree. Moreover, if there is a state-based policy reason for the
"patent free zone," as opposed to simply the failure of the patent
holder to obtain patent protection in the relevant country, then that
situation is afforded different treatment in an effort to respect the

199. See Voda, 476 F.3d at 901 ("[W]e see no reason why American courts should supplant
British, Canadian, French, or German courts in interpreting and enforcing British, Canadian,
European, French, or German patents.").
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policy choice of the impacted country. In particular, if the U.S.
patent owner tried to obtain a patent in the relevant country and
failed to do so, then there would be a strong suggestion that the
country has some objection to this invention that must be taken into
account. A necessary threshold evaluation to make, then, is why
does the U.S. patent holder not have a patent in the relevant
country?
a. U.S. Patent Holder Does Not Have Patent Because
Someone Else Does
One reason the U.S. patentee may not have protection in the
relevant country is that someone else already has obtained a patent
there. Rules determining who is entitled to a patent vary from
country to country. As a case in point, the United States's unique
"first-to-invent" system could create variations in patent ownership
in contrast to every other foreign system's "first-to-file" system. °°
The patent could be owned by the actual accused infringer, or the
accused infringer could be a licensee of the patent owner in the
relevant country. If so, then there is a clear conflict between the
patent laws of the foreign country and the United States in terms of
ownership. Courts in other contexts have recognized that ownership
can be a source of conflict and a reason to decline applying U.S.
law.2 01 The accused infringer has the right to practice the invention
in that country. This situation would be even stronger than an
accused infringer having a personal defense in the country, such as
prior user rights. If the accused infringer is in fact the patent owner

200. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (g)(2) (2000); European Patent Office, Patents Around the
World, http://www.epo.org/focus/patent-system/patents-around-the-world.html (last visited
Mar. 29,2008) (discussing the European Patent Office, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
and the Japan Patent Office, as well as the key differences between the "first-to-file" and
"first-to-invent" systems).
201. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286-87 (1952) (discussing ownership
conflicts in the context of registered trademarks); cf. Wasserman, supra note 142, at 304-05.
I consider this factor to be determinative, whereas Wasserman would merely treat it as one
factor to be balanced against several others. See id. at 304 ("Nonetheless, this [conflict with
foreign law] should not be a dispositive factor because patent law differs substantially from
country to country."). To the contrary, this variation in nations' patent laws is precisely why
the factor should be dispositive-to respect those national policy preferences as reflected in
a given country's patent law.
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in the relevant country, then U.S. patent law should not apply
extraterritorially.° 2
If the patent in the foreign country is owned by someone other
than the infringer, then the conflict is less profound. The U.S.
patent holder does not have the right to exclude others from
practicing the patented invention in the relevant country. Thus, the
duality principle would be violated-there would be no infringement
with respect to this patent holder within the foreign country.
Moreover, allowing the infringement suit to proceed in the United
States would place the accused infringer in the position of potentially facing double liability-the infringer could be infringing both
the foreign patent and the U.S. patent. °3 Consequently, although
the conflict is less, the courts should decline to enforce the U.S.
patent extraterritorially if the corresponding foreign patent is
owned by a third party. °4
b. U.S. PatentHolder Tried and Failed To ProcurePatent
Protectionin the Countries in Question
The equities of the situation differ significantly if the U.S.
patentee tried and failed to obtain a patent in the countries of
interest, and no one else has been successful in obtaining patent
protection. A country's rejection of the patent strongly suggests that
there is a policy reason to deny protection in that country. As such,
it would be highly problematic as a matter of comity to allow the
extraterritorial enforcement of the U.S. patent in such a circumstance, although it still may be possible if the country in question is

202. In the less stringent approach to this method, the existence of the conflict would
simply be one factor that could be considered relevant in assessing whether to apply U.S.
patent law extraterritorially. This would be more in line with Dinwoodie's approach and that
of the Ninth Circuit in the trademark context, where a "rule of reason" approach is used. See
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting
factors "to be balanced in the 'jurisdictional rule of reason' of comity and fairness");
Dinwoodie, supra note 3, at 545-47.
203. If the nature of the infringement was transnational, such as in the NTP II case, then
there would not be infringement of the foreign patent and there would be no risk of being
liable for infringing both. See NTP II, 418 F.3d 1282, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
204. Admittedly, this could allow the infringer to escape liability if the device straddles the
two countries. This methodology, however, is not intended effectively to allow every patentee
to close perceived loopholes created by the territorial nature of the U.S. patent right.
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a rogue intellectual property nation who has intentionally created
a system to undermine patent right regimes elsewhere." 5 Thus,
attempting and failing will not per se disqualify the patent holder
from protection.
The situation differs slightly if the patent owner simply abandoned the application. In that case, there would be no definitive
statement by a relevant government concerning the validity of the
patent. One could argue that an estoppel-like approach could be
used: because the patent owner abandoned the application, she
should not be able to use an extraterritorial application of a U.S.
patent to close the self-created gap in protection. This approach
would be harsh, though, and would put the patent owner in a worse
position than if she never made efforts to obtain protection in the
relevant country. This proposal is not intended to create disincentives to using foreign patent offices and procedures. As such,
abandonment of an application will be treated as if the patent
holder simply did not have patent protection in the relevant
country. °6
c. PatentHolder Simply Does Not Have a Patent,Nor Does
Anyone Else
The final situation is that there simply could be no one with a
patent in the relevant country. In this context, we have nothing to
guide the analysis-neither a rejection by a patent office, nor a
patent owned by someone else. Moreover, the proposed method must
attempt to discern what the relevant country would do if presented
with a given patent.
In order to assess the validity of a patent, however, the court
requires some basis of comparison. Simply asking in the abstract
'"Would this invention be patentable in the foreign country?" ignores
the basic nature of a validity analysis---comparing the claims of the
205. See infra Part II.C.3.
206. The courts could inquire as to the reasons for the abandonment. A financial decision
not to pursue the application, for lack of a market or for lack of adequate patent scope, would
not suggest much about the validity of the patent. But the patent owner might have believed
the invention was not eligible. Attempting to divine the motivation of the applicant, though,
would unnecessarily increase the complexity and difficulty of this method. In the interest of
keeping this approach as simple as possible, I would not recommend engaging in this analysis.
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patent to the relevant prior art. The claims define the metes and
bounds of the invention and, therefore, are essential in assessing
the validity of a patent. Therefore, in making this assessment, a
court should use the U.S. patent as a proxy for a foreign patent.
Such an assumption is not a stretch. Given the coordination of
patent application through the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)
process, patents often are very similar in form from country to
country." 7 The court would then assess whether the U.S. patent
holder would have been able to obtain patent protection in the
relevant country.
A threshold issue would be the appropriate date to use for
assessing the validity of the patent. One reason that a country's
patent office could deny protection is because the invention is not
new or lacks inventive step (that is, is obvious using the U.S.
standard). In this method, the priority date for the U.S. patent
should be used. This may be the U.S. filing date, but it may also be
a priority date based on the Paris Convention or the PCT. Given the
rights of priority afforded by international treaties, the use of the
U.S. priority date is not unfair or unjust in any way.
A court would then assess whether the invention claimed in the
U.S. patent would be eligible for patent protection under the laws
of the relevant foreign country. The basis could be any legitimate
basis under the relevant laws, such as lack of novelty, inventive
step, eligible subject matter, or the application of permissible
exclusions from patent protection.20 ' Given that there is likely
overlap between the prior art used in evaluating the validity of the
U.S. patent, the court may not have to reinvent the wheel to make
this determination.

207. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, available at http://www.
wipo.int/treaties/enlregistrationpct/.
208. See TRIPS, supranote 8,art. 27, 1 ("[P]atents shall be available for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve
an inventive step and are capable of industrial application."); id. 2 (allowing exclusion of
patent protection if "necessary to protect ordrepublicor morality, including to protect human,
animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment"); id. 1 3
(allowing exclusion of patent protection for "diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for
the treatment of humans or animals" and "plants and animals other than micro-organisms,
and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than nonbiological and microbiological processes").
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One problem under this branch of the analysis is that the U.S.
court would be required to apply foreign law, with which it likely is
not familiar. °9 Although this will add complexity and difficulty to
the analysis, it is surmountable. Even though courts, and particularly the Federal Circuit, have questioned the competency of U.S.
courts to assess foreign law, there is no reason to suspect that the
courts would be unable to do so. To begin, while principles of
patentability vary across the globe, many of the fundamental
concepts that underlie patent protection have reached a certain level
of coherence and general recognition. So the courts would have a
baseline familiarity with the concepts of the law.2 10 As such, the law
should seem less "foreign" to the courts than other domestic issues
a federal court might encounter pursuant to its supplemental
jurisdiction.2 1' For example, TRIPS requires all inventions to be

209. See Mars Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(noting that adjudicating a Japanese patent infringement claim would "require the court to
resolve complex issues of Japanese procedural and substantive law, a task further
complicated by 'having to agree on the proper translation of laws, documents and other
communications,"' and implicating "international comity" by exercising jurisdiction "over a
matter involving a Japanese patent, Japanese law, and acts of a Japanese defendant in
Japan" (quoting Mars Inc. v. Nippon Conlux Kabushiki-Kaisha, 825 F. Supp. 73, 76 (D. Del.
1993))); In re Kathawala, 9 F.3d 942, 945 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (rejecting argument that the court
should look to Greek law regarding validity because it "would place an 'unrealistic burden' on
the courts and PTO to resolve 'esoteric legal questions which may arise under the patent laws
of numerous foreign countries"' (quoting In re Kathawala, Patent Appeal No. 88-1921, slip.
op. at 21 (B.P.A.I. July 17, 1992))); see also Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d
633, 647 (2d Cir. 1956) ("But we do not think it the province of United States district courts
to determine the validity of trade-marks which officials of foreign countries have seen fit to
grant. To do so would be to welcome conflicts with the administrative and judicial officers of
the Dominion of Canada.").
210. Chisum, supra note 4, at 610-11 ("In fact, such difficulties [in assessing the validity
of a foreign patent] will not often arise. The patentability requirements in other countries are
usually more straightforward and less dependent on issues of historic fact than those in the
United States.").
211. For example, the Federal Circuit has been presented with state law claims involving
contracts, unfair competition, interference with business relationships, trademark
infringement, and copyright infringement. See, e.g., State Contracting & Eng'g Corp. v.
Condotte Am., Inc., 197 F. App'x 915, 918-19 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (determining jurisdiction on a
charging lien); Arlaine & Gina Rockey, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 175 F. App'x 329, 331 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (deciding a state contract law cause of action); Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 423
F.3d 1260, 1267-69 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (analyzing trade secret and contract claims); On-Line
Techs., Inc. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer, 386 F.3d 1133, 1140-41 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(examining state law claims of trade secret violations); Silent Drive, Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc.,
326 F.3d 1194, 1200, 1203, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (discussing state law claim of tortious
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novel and non-obvious and contain an enabling disclosure.2 12 These
basic concepts are therefore common to many countries. Although
a country's particular application of those principles may vary from
the United States's, the basic concepts are quite similar.
Moreover, the parties in the litigation have every incentive to
educate the court as to the relevant law. The accused infringer
necessarily has a presence in the relevant country and should have
some familiarity with the law there. The U.S. patent holder may be
at a disadvantage in this regard because there is no reason for the
U.S. patent holder to be familiar with the laws of the particular
country at issue. For those that believe extraterritorial application
of a U.S. patent should be exceptional in nature, this pragmatic
disadvantage should be of no concern. It would mean that proving
an infringement case would simply be more difficult for the U.S.
patent holder. The patent holder, though, would generally bring the
suit and, knowing that this proposed methodology would govern the
case, she would have a strong incentive to learn about the law of the
relevant jurisdictions prior to bringing the suit. Admittedly, a case
could arise where the patent holder is not aware of the extraterritorial or transnational nature of the case until discovery has begun,"'
but it would seem that those cases would be the exception. Courts
as generalists are quite adept at educating themselves about new
law, and the laws at issue here would at least have some sense of
familiarity to courts in patent infringement cases. The Federal
Circuit in particular should not fear applying foreign patent law
given its expertise in the area of patent law.214

interference).
212. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 27, T 1; art. 29, 1.
213. For example, the patent holder in the NTP H case conceivably may not have known
that the relay component was in Canada until discovery surrounding the system was
permitted. Similarly, a patent holder may only be aware that someone has made an offer to
sell the patented invention within the United States without knowing that the ultimate sale
is to take place outside of the United States. These scenarios seem rather unlikely, and the
patent holder likely would be aware of the nature of the case it is about to bring and would
therefore know to investigate the law of the relevant country.
214. See, e.g., Biotech. Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Serio-US Indus., Inc. v. Plastic Recovery
Techs. Corp., 459 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Agfa Corp. v. Creo Prods. Inc., 451 F.3d 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
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3. The Problem of Rogue Countries
There is one significant problem with giving absolute deference
to the decision of a foreign country in denying patent protection or
in assessing whether the country would have granted a patent. The
relevant country may have decided, contrary to international norms,
to ignore the protection of intellectual property rights, becoming an
infringement safe-haven.21 Such countries would allow uses of
intellectual property rights in contravention of international norms.
In those circumstances, infringement under the U.S. patent would
not be precluded because it would undermine even the accepted
minimum levels of intellectual property protection that have been
established internationally.
Discerning whether a country is such a rogue intellectual
property country may be difficult, but there are various sources of
evidence that may suggest that a country is failing to live up to
international expectations. For example, the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) performs annual reviews of the adequacy of
other countries' protections of intellectual property under the
Special 301 power.2 16 The analysis in these reports could serve as
sound evidence that a given country should be considered a rogue
one.
Secondary references, such as articles in the media, could also be
used to support the argument that the country is acting intentionally to free-ride on intellectual property rights. If a country is in the
business of violating intellectual property rights, then it is likely
that the businesses interacting with the country or encountering
problems with the country will let their grievances be known
publicly. Finally, a court could also review the country's patent laws

215. See, e.g., Burk, Transborder, supra note 7, at 11 ("[These offshore havens could
provide information services which, if offered within the borders of the United States, would
violate traditional intellectual property laws."); Dinwoodie, supra note 3, at 540 ('This
approach of pragmatic localization may be problematic, however, because it might encourage
a race to the bottom in order to attract particular business.").
216. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2901-06 (2006); see
also Cynthia M. Ho, Biopiracy and Beyond: A Considerationof Socio-CulturalConflicts with
GlobalPatentPolicies, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 433,484-85 (2006). More detail on Special 301
is available at http://www.ustr.gov/TradeSectors/IntellectualProperty/SectionIndex.html
(last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
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directly to determine whether a country should be viewed as a
rogue.
This category of rogue intellectual property nations would not
include those developing and least developing countries that have
joined the World Trade Organization and have been given grace
periods for implementing certain intellectual property protection.21 7
If the relevant country is justified in its denial of patent protection
under these phase-in provisions, then that policy should be respected and the country will not be viewed as rogue.
Another potential way of dealing with the issue of rogue countries
would be to consider the intent of the accused infringer.2 18 If the
primary purpose for placing the various activities in the relevant
country was to avoid infringement, then such bad faith would
suggest there should be infringement. Consideration of the intent
of the infringer might give some insight into the standards of the
country in question, and thus may be relevant, though such subjective assessment by the infringer would not be terribly probative.
Moreover, creating factors in this methodology that are dependent
on intent makes predictability even more difficult, as the patent
holder would be unable ex ante to assess that intent. As such, the
intent of the infringer to game the system would not be necessary
in this analysis.
D. Would the Infringer'sActivities Infringe in the Foreign
Country?
The ultimate step in this analysis-using either the procured
foreign patent or the U.S. patent-would be to assess whether there
would be infringement in the relevant country, ignoring territorial
lines. To determine whether there is infringement, the court would

217. See World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, WT/MN(01)/DEC/W/2, 41 I.L.M. 755, 756 (2002); TRIPS, supra note 8, at art. 66,
para. 1 ("We also agree that the least-developed country members will not be obliged, with
respect to pharmaceutical products, to implement or apply Sections 5 and 7 of Part II of the
TRIPS Agreement or to enforce rights provided for under these Sections until 1 January 2016,
without prejudice to the right of least-developed country members to seek other extensions
of the transition periods as provided for in Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.").
218. Cf. Wasserman, supra note 142, at 306 (considering intent of infringer to "harm or
affect American commerce").
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then look at either the relevant foreign patents (if in existence) or
the U.S. patent. The court would assess whether the individual
patents would be infringed, ignoring any territorial limits. For
example, in the NTP II case2 19 (assuming that there was a Canadian
patent), the court would evaluate whether the accused system
infringed the Canadian patent as if the entire system was in
Canada. Similarly, courts would determine whether the device
assembled overseas would infringe under that country's patent law
(akin to § 271(f)2°), or whether the method being performed would
infringe under that country's patent law (akin to § 271(g)22 1). Under
current law, of course, courts do not make this assessment under
either §§ 271(f) or (g), so this methodology would add a constraint to
these two provisions.
Included in the infringement analysis would be personal defenses
available to the infringer in the relevant country, such as prior user
rights. If the personal defense would apply in the relevant foreign
country, then there would be no infringement and ultimately no
liability under the U.S. patent. Moreover, the United States provides greater protection than many other countries by permitting
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.22 2 Many foreign
jurisdictions do not have such a doctrine and require the accused
device to be identical to what is claimed in the United States.
Therefore, differences in the scope of protection may result in
variances between U.S. and foreign law that the courts should
respect and implement under this analysis.
The U.S. courts should feel free to consider a variety of evidence
to facilitate its consideration of foreign law. To begin, many foreign
jurisdictions are based on the civil law system, not common law.
U.S. courts, therefore, should first consult the relevant statutes,
which often are more elucidating than U.S. laws, in the given civil

219. NTP II, 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
220. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000).
221. § 271(g).
222. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 730-33
(2002); Warner-Johnson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,24-28 (1997); Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-10 (1950); see Timothy R.
Holbrook, Possessionin PatentLaw, 59 S.M.U. L. REv. 123, 164-65 (2006); Bernard R. Pravel,
Why the United States Should Adopt the First-to-FileSystem for Patents, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J.
797, 807 (1991) (noting doctrine of equivalents is "unavailable under foreign patent laws").
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systems. Moreover, it may be the case that the courts in the
relevant countries have already passed on similar infringement
issues. Although the court would not formally recognize the foreign
judgment (which would only be the case if the same parties were
involved), the U.S. court is free to glean relevant information about
the foreign patent law from the decision, such as the relevant
country's approach to construing the claims.
The issue of rogue countries can also arise under this factor. If
there is some other reason to believe that the relevant country is
protecting patent rights at a level below the minimal standards
expected by TRIPS for that country, then a court would have the
discretion to still enforce the U.S. patent. Just as lack of patent
protection in a rogue country would not preclude enforcement under
this method, the failure to enforce patents within the country would
allow enforcement under the U.S. patent if all other conditions are
satisfied.
III. IS THE COMPARATIVE METHOD DESIRABLE? THE PROS AND

CONS
The proposed methodology attempts to balance both the benefits
and disadvantages of either a pure effects test or a strict territorial
approach. Of course, trying to find a middle ground may simply
exacerbate the negatives and eliminate the positives of the basic two
approaches. This Part will evaluate the benefits and criticisms of
the proposed approach.
A. The Advantages of the Proposed Methodology
1. The ComparativeApproach Minimizes Conflicts of Law
The primary benefit of the comparative method proposed in this
Article is that it affords greater respect to foreign countries' policies
regarding patent law. The status quo completely ignores these
differences, focusing only on U.S. law. Similarly, the various
proposed effects tests utterly ignore the potential for conflicts with
foreign law. Differences are permissible under our international
treaties. Countries can act as individual laboratories, creating a variety of solutions to different innovation policy issues. One of these
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countries may find the best answer, and requiring courts to consider
those differences may help improve our own laws. Additionally,
respecting the policies of foreign sovereigns is also of great importance. These countries should be accorded respect and deference,
just as the United States would expect respect and deference to its
laws if applied by a foreign tribunal.
2. Considerationof Foreign Law Can Create Dialogue and Help
Develop InternationalNorms of Patent Law
An important aspect of the proposed methodology is that it brings
into formal consideration the laws of the country where some of the
acts take place. This lack of consideration was Canada's primary
concern with the NTP II case,22 3 not the ultimate conclusion of
liability.22 4 Now, foreign law will be considered explicitly and
transparently when determining whether to apply a U.S. patent to
activities outside of the United States.
Moreover, this express consideration of foreign law will have the
added benefit of creating dialogue between U.S. courts and foreign
jurisdictions, particularly between the Federal Circuit and other
specialized patent courts. By analyzing the foreign law, the judges
can reach a greater understanding of the various intellectual
property norms that exist in the world, and indeed may be able to
identify situations where these norms have converged into an
international standard.
This dialogue, however, also respects those circumstances where
the laws of a foreign country may differ. Litigants and foreign
countries alike will know that the U.S. courts will not disrupt the

223. See Brief of the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae, supra note 162, at **4-6
(discussing the need for comity and consideration of foreign and international law); see also
Sookman, supra note 7, at 465 ("Canada is also concerned that the potential implications of
the panel's interpretation described above would negatively impact the integrity of the
operation of Canadian intellectual property laws." (internal citation omitted)).
224. Brief of the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae, supra note 162, at **3-4 (CThe
Government of Canada acknowledges that national jurisdiction over trans-border technology
may be justifiable under internationally accepted theories of national jurisdiction. However,
it is respectfully suggested that these principles should be applied explicitly when applicable
and justified by a specific set of facts giving rise to that application of national law." (citation
omitted)).
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expectations of parties in relevant countries and will respect policy
differences between countries, so long as that difference is not
merely an effort by a country to be an intellectual property piracy
haven. Our courts can only benefit from considering the varying
policies of foreign countries that may lead to levels of protection that
vary from those within the United States. Particularly, exploration
of the differing grounds for validity in foreign systems would inform
the courts' views of our own system. Indeed, foreign courts have
considered U.S. law in assessing the validity of patents in their own
countries, 22 5 and such dialogue would facilitate greater understanding of the similarities and differences between the countries' patent
laws.
Similarly, varying methods of assessing the scope of the right to
exclude via infringement analysis could provide useful tools and
approaches to U.S. courts who must wrestle with uncertainty
surrounding claim construction and the application of the doctrine
of equivalents. To the extent that the courts, and particularly the
Federal Circuit, are implementing patent and innovation policy,
these courts should inform their decisions through a comparative
lens, particularly in light of the increasingly international nature of
intellectual property law.
Such dialogue need not be limited to the courts. Likely decisions
by the courts relying on the USTR's investigations could serve as
confirmation or contradiction of the conclusions found in the Special
301 reports. 226 The comparison of U.S. and foreign patent law would
yield a more objective assessment of those standards, uncolored by
possible trade or other interests unrelated to innovation policy. The
court's reasoning therefore could complement or contradict the
USTR report, facilitating greater discussion of these issues.
Congress could also benefit from these explorations of foreign law
by U.S. courts. The decisions by U.S. courts may provide reasoning
that would help Congress assess whether to amend the Patent Act,
particularly if Congress is attempting to implement legislation in
the name of harmonization. A court's reasoned analysis about the

225. See, e.g., Harvard Coll. v. Canada (Comm'r of Patents), [2002] S.C.R. 45, paras. 36-38
(Can.) (discussing U.S. patent law in determining eligible subject matter under Canadian
law); see also Lee, supra note 172.
226. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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manner in which foreign jurisdictions deal with various patent
issues would be a useful source of information for legislators who
are attempting to fine tune, if not completely overhaul, U.S. patent
law.
B. Problems with the ComparativeApproach
Of course, no proposal is perfect and all have their downsides.
This section will discuss the potential negative consequences of
adopting this, or similar, approaches.
1. Are Courts Institutionally Competent To Address These
Issues?
This proposal assumes that courts would be the ones to apply the
proposed methodology, but one could argue that institutionally they
should not be put in the position of applying and interpreting
foreign law. These issues could be addressed at the international
level through bilateral or multilateral agreements or by international institutions who consider these issues. As Graeme Dinwoodie
has persuasively argued in the copyright context, however, these
institutions are incredibly slow moving and do not react timely to
changes in technology.22 7 The transnational nature of business and
technology will bring these issues to the forefront well before these
international actors can react. Of course, having an international
agreement that adopts the proposed methodology would be helpful
in its implementation, but because the courts will likely encounter
these problems in the first instance, it is reasonable to provide them
with tools to address these concerns.
One could also argue that, within the United States, it is the
executive branch-not the judicial branch-that should be making
these determinations. The executive, particularly the USTR, has
expertise in dealing not only with intellectual property but also with
other trade-related international issues. My proposal is flexible
enough, however, to accommodate the USTR. The proposal specifically recognizes the importance of Special 301 power and reports.

227. Dinwoodie, supra note 3, at 489-520.
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The proposal could be altered to either permit the USTR to join a
case as an intervenor or, more dramatically, to require USTR
permission to allow the case to go forward. Providing the USTR such
a veto would allow the executive branch to maintain control over a
particular situation where there may be other issues of concern to
the United States that are intertwined with a given litigation. This
dynamic can presently be seen in litigation before the International
Trade Commission, where government attorneys are always involved in the case given the possible political issues surrounding the
importation of allegedly infringing goods. 228 The interest and
expertise of the executive branch could easily be accommodated by
the proposed methodology.
2. Reduction in Ex Ante Certaintyand Predictability
Another risk with the proposed methodology is a potential
reduction in certainty and predictability for patentees and infringers alike.2 29 In contrast to a pure effects test, this seems highly
unpersuasive: this approach gives clear guidelines as to what
activities will and will not be subject to a U.S. patent. In contrast to
a strict territorial approach, however, this criticism may have some
bite.
But that bite is rather toothless. To begin, even in the instances
where courts were arguably applying a strict territorial approach,
they also offered tortured interpretations of the statute to accommodate changing economic circumstances, such as in NTP 11 3 o and
AT&T.2 3 ' Thus, even in a strictly territorial system, there may be
little predictability.

228. The International Trade Commission (ITC) is the appropriate forum for bringing an
unfair competition or patent suit against one who imports into the United States articles that
may be covered by a U.S. trademark or patent. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2000). See generally
Robert A. Caplen, Recent Trends UnderscoringInternationalTrade Commission Review of
Initial Determinationsand Federal Circuit Appeals from Final Commission Determinations
Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 337
(2007).
229. See Austin, supra note 7, at 610-11.
230. 418 F.3d 1282, 1313-24 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
231. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1369-72 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd,
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
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The proposed method also provides greater certainty than a pure
totality of the circumstances approach that could be used in this
context, evaluating all relevant sources for assessing whether there
should be infringement. Strict application of the proposed method
would guide not only the courts but also patent holders and
potential infringers in making the assessment of whether there may
be liability for various transnational acts. Some of the factors in this
analysis may be uncertain, such as whether a country is rogue or
whether a given country would have issued a patent, as evaluated
by a U.S. patent. But this uncertainty is not any greater than most
patent law issues. By using this framework, parties should be able
to make informed conclusions about the risk of liability. Moreover,
over time, the courts may establish clearer interpretations of the
laws in various countries, particularly if there are "repeat" countries
as players in this analysis. Undeniably, there may be some greater
uncertainty in this approach, but it seems a small price to pay for
greater protection in the international marketplace.
3. The Loss of Legal Diversity
One potential criticism of this approach, as cogently articulated
by Professor Graeme Austin, is that these approaches would rely on
"substantive outcomes [that] might not resemble any that might be
dictated by the domestic laws that could be applied under conventional private international law principles."2" 2 Professor Austin
further questions "whether this is an appropriate judicial task, and
whether it is really feasible to identify intellectual property policies
divorced from broader societal concerns in diverse areas such as
technological development, education and literacy, agriculture, and
so on."2'33 Elsewhere, Professor Austin has emphasized the importance of maintaining diversity at the national level in our intellectual property regimes.2" There may be reasons that a national
232. See Austin, supra note 7, at 610.
233. Id. at 611 (emphasis omitted).
234. Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in
TransnationalCopyright Infringement Litigation,23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 8-11 (1999);
Graeme W. Austin, Social Policy Choices and Choice of Law for Copyright Infringement in
Cyberspace, 79 OR. L. REV. 575 (2000); Graeme W. Austin, Valuing "Domestic SelfDetermination"in InternationalIntellectual Property Jurisprudence,77 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
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government chooses to have a different standard for intellectual
property, reflecting value choices and social concerns that may differ
from the United States or other developed countries.
I agree that local variations in intellectual property regimes are
good. Aside from respecting cultural values in a given country, such
variety may also provide laboratories for more efficient intellectual
property laws, in much the same way as the federal system works
within the United States.23 5 Global harmonization misleadingly
insists that the best approach is "one-size-fits-all," even if that one
size may not necessarily be the best size. As such, harmonization
can come at an all-too-often underappreciated price.
That being said, the methodology proposed here provides a
method of balancing the concerns articulated by Professor Austin.
First, the courts would not be applying a substantive rule of law
that is absent from the domestic law of a given country; the
balancing here would require application of that country's law,
preserving the diversity within the law and affording respect to the
cultural and social values that may underlie those laws. The
approach espoused in this Article is an attempt to grant some
extraterritorial protection to U.S. patent holders in response to an
increasingly global economic environment, while at the same time
affording respect and deference to competing policy and social
values that may be in place in other countries. My approach is an
effort to balance the concerns of Professor Austin while affording a
potential remedy to patent holders against those that may play the
territorial game with patent rights.
CONCLUSION

It is incontrovertible that the world is a smaller place. Globalization has made traditional territorial borders break down. With
respect to intellectual property, this development was first realized
in the copyright and trademark areas.3 6 Patents must now face the

1155 (2002).
235. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory ....").
236. See generally Dinwoodie, supranote 3; Holbrook, Territoriality,supranote 4, at 736-
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reality of the erosion of national borders. The Federal Circuit has
failed to articulate a coherent, predictable approach to these
problems, issuing opinions that represent a myopic focus on
statutory interpretation and a failure to articulate a consistent
jurisprudential viewpoint on the territoriality of patent rights.2 3 v
The consideration of foreign law is conspicuously absent from the
current approaches to dealing with extraterritoriality in U.S. patent
law. This short-sightedness ignores the fact that patents and patent
laws necessarily reflect the social values of a given country. 238 An
overly broad approach to territoriality of patent laws would undermine those value choices made by a given country in the name of
providing protection to a single, private patent holder. Such an
unbalanced approach undermines the sovereignty of the country in
which the relevant activity is taking place. The proposal in this
Article presents a coherent, balanced way to address these issues
that acknowledges our increasingly global world, a world where
balancing the interests of other nations may also be increasingly
important. U.S. patent holders deserve some level of extraterritorial
protection for their inventions, but such reach must not run afoul of
potential competing interests in foreign countries. This proposal can
accomplish that objective.

38.
237. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
238. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents,84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 573 (2006) (discussing the role of morality in patent protection).

